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ARTICLES
The Commensurability Myth
in Antitrust
Rebecca Haw Allensworth*
Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In
fact, competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes
associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. What are offered in
antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically
qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment
as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust
cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate
“net” competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the
same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to courts because it appears to
allow the law to avoid the murky, value-laden compromises struck by other
areas of regulation. But courts have suppressed important debates about what
matters most about competition by glossing over the fact that even given a
narrow mandate—to protect competition—antitrust law must make contested
value judgments. Debunking the commensurability myth is the first step in
stimulating scholarly and judicial debates about how to balance antitrust’s
inherent tradeoffs, such as price effects with qualitative consumer welfare,
*
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present with future benefits from competition, and consumer welfare among
different classes of purchasers.
This Article explores the commensurability myth, using Sherman Act §
1 cases to illustrate the incommensurability of most pro- and anticompetitive
effects claimed in an antitrust suit. It then argues that the myth distorts
antitrust litigation as courts find ways—such as insurmountable burdens of
proof—to avoid the appearance of incommensurate balancing. Finally, it
identifies the doctrinal and institutional debates—largely missing from
antitrust discourse today—raised by confronting the commensurability problem
in antitrust.
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INTRODUCTION
At its heart, antitrust law believes it is exceptional. Unlike most
areas of regulation where rules must trade off costs and benefits
different in kind, antitrust claims to pursue one single goal:
competition.1 Courts often endorse the idea that the values traded off
in competition regulation—the procompetitive effects and the
anticompetitive effects—are commensurate. For example, courts
frequently characterize Sherman Act § 1 as condemning restraints on

1.
See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”); Gregory J.
Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 714 (2014)
(“[T]he impact of a challenged restraint on the competitive process is the only issue the Court
considers under the rule of reason.”).
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trade having a “net” anticompetitive effect, and condoning those whose
effects sum to a neutral or procompetitive effect. This supposedly
unitary goal of antitrust—to facilitate competition—allows the law to
appear to avoid the murky, value-laden compromises struck by other
areas of regulation.
But antitrust law is not exceptional. Even within the nowdominant paradigm that antitrust pursues only economic goals,2 value
judgments are unavoidable. What are typically offered in antitrust
cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are rarely two sides
of the same coin, and there is no such monolithic thing as “competition”
that is furthered or impeded by competitor conduct. In fact,
competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes
associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. Antitrust law
often must trade off one kind of competition for another, or one salutary
effect of competition (such as price, quality or innovation) for another.
And in so doing, antitrust courts must make judgments between
different and incommensurate values.
The incommensurability problem is not entirely unrecognized in
antitrust discourse, but it is downplayed in a manner harmful to policy
and doctrine.3 Antitrust scholars acknowledge—and sometimes even
highlight—the incomparability of the effects they measure.4 Judicial
opinions occasionally, although less often, contain explicit discussions
of the disparate competitive values at stake.5 But more often, these
judgments are implicit.

2.
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). Phrases of this
ilk are ubiquitous; see, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984) (“[T]he policy
unequivocally laid down by the [Sherman] Act is competition.” (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958))).
3.
Professor Maurice E. Stucke, for example, has a nice, but very brief, discussion of the
problem in his article Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1375, 1441–46 (2009) (“Economists, much less judicial fact-finders, are ill-equipped to quantify the
value of different forms of competition, such as inter- and intrabrand competition, static versus
dynamic efficiency, and a restraint’s impact on that competition.”).
4.
See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free
Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 36 (2015) (observing that antitrust must sometimes trade off
incommensurable values associated with free speech and innovation); Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust
Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1171–72 (1984) (briefly observing that the Rule of Reason
“typically will involve [balancing] incommensurable factors”); Werden, supra note 1, at 755
(recognizing the problem of incommensurability but declining to explore its significance for his
defense of “competition” as the unitary goal of antitrust). Cf. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs,
Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 282 (2010) (noting that
the costs and benefits of the US’s and EU’s different approaches to antitrust are
incommensurable).
5.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007)
(debating the merits of intrabrand versus interbrand competition).
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The absence of attention to the fact that procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects, as they are presented in an antirust suit, are
usually incommensurate, and the absence of debate about how to trade
them off means that antitrust law is under-theorized. Rhetoric of
commensurability in antitrust has made it unpopular for judges to
acknowledge the use of value judgments in deciding antitrust cases.6
This has pushed important debates about those values into the subtext
of antitrust opinions rather than allowing for the full and open
discussion that they merit. It has also led to a set of doctrines that
courts use to avoid the appearance of judgment, which distort antitrust
litigation usually in favor of defendants. These evasive maneuvers have
made a mess out of questions such as when the burden of production
shifts from plaintiff to defendant, which arguments require empirical
proof or a rigorously defined market, and what kinds of procompetitive
justifications are categorically illegitimate.
This Article uses Sherman Act § 1 liability to illustrate the
incommensurability of most pro- and anticompetitive effects in
antitrust litigation. Although the problem pervades antitrust law and
policy, § 1 doctrine nicely illustrates the (false) exceptionalism of
antitrust. The rhetoric of the Rule of Reason7 (the dominant mode of §1
analysis) exemplifies the problem: it claims to protect agreements that
enhance competition and condemn those that destroy it,8 as if
“competition” referred to one single value that antitrust must promote.
But below the surface, the cases and rules actually do struggle with how
to trade off very different benefits and costs of agreements among
6.
See infra Section I.B (discussing the origins and modern manifestations of the use of value
judgments in deciding antitrust cases).
7.
The Rule of Reason under § 1 of the Sherman Act—a standard that balances pro- with
anticompetitive effects—is the standard used for all restraints on trade not subject to per se
condemnation. Only hard-core price fixing and other cartel-like activities are condemned per se—
that is, without hearing defenses of their efficiency. All other agreements among competitors are
evaluated under the Rule of Reason, which condemns restraints whose negative competitive effects
(“anticompetitive effects”) outweigh their benefits to competition (“procompetitive effects”). Those
that are more “pro” than “anti” pass muster under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff must show that the
net effect of a challenged restraint is harmful to competition.”); Werden, supra note 1, at 744, 748–
49.
8.
See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“[Under the Rule of
Reason,] the test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.” (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918))); Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition.”); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
under the Rule of Reason, the plaintiff should show an agreement “has been to restrict competition,
rather than promote it”).
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competitors. Examples include trading off quantitative for qualitative
measures of consumer welfare, balancing present and future
competitive effects, and trading off competitive effects on different
classes of consumers. These latent debates play out in cases considering
restraints that suppress intrabrand competition while stimulating
interbrand competition,9 that trade a free market with failures for a
self-regulated market with suppressed rivalry,10 and that create a “new
product” by otherwise restricting competition.
I do not intend to argue that antitrust should take into account
a broader set of social goals such as wealth redistribution, protection of
small businesses, or mitigating the evils of bigness.11 These common
criticisms of modern antitrust run contrary to over three decades of
consensus among courts—and most scholars—that antitrust ought to
pursue only economic goals in the form of competition.12 What this
account intends to do is to point out that this consensus, as it is often
presented by courts and commentators, contains an important and
problematic hypocrisy. A focus on purely economic effects is sometimes
touted as avoiding difficult value judgments,13 but it does no such thing.
9.
Compare Leegin, 551 U.S. at 878 (implying that it was appropriate to trade off reduced
intrabrand competition for greater interbrand competition because “the primary purpose of
[antitrust law] is to protect [interbrand] competition”), with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972) (generally accepting a reduction in intrabrand competition in support of
interbrand competition, but noting a general “inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense,
destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another
sector”).
10. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760–62 (1999); Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635
F.3d 815, 819–22 (6th Cir. 2011).
11. For scholars discussing and rejecting non-economic justifications for antitrust
intervention, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust:
An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 475–76 (2012); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
Modified: Education, Defense, and Other Worthy Enterprises, 9 ANTITRUST, Spring 1995, at 23,
25; and Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 350 (2010).
12. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 909 (stating that the goal of the Sherman Act is to “bring about
the lower prices . . . and more efficient production processes that consumers typically desire”
through competitive market forces); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (explaining that
the Sherman Act is intended to promote competition); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001)
(same); Adam J. Di Vincenzo, Editor's Note: Robert Bork, Originalism, And Bounded Antitrust, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 821, 833 (2014) (discussing the “enduring consensus” that antitrust serves only
economic goals); Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure
Defense To Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 254 (1993) (noting that “the courts,
commentators, and even critics have more or less reached consensus that efficiency is the
appropriate objective when analyzing antitrust issues”); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer
Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 135–36 (2010) (observing that most antitrust
scholars “now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust
laws”).
13. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 114–15 (2d ed. 1993).
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Nor does this Article argue that antitrust law must be
completely reformed. I mean to observe that antitrust courts do trade
off incommensurate values in Rule of Reason cases, and that is as it
must be. Given that this is the inevitable project of antitrust law, I
argue that a more honest account of what kind of balancing is involved
will improve the rationality, transparency, and legitimacy of the law.
This Article suggests a significant change in the way we talk about
antitrust law, but I do not argue that the incommensurability of
competitive effects makes antitrust judging impossible or illegitimate.
Rather I argue that recognizing the incommensurate nature of the
values in tension in the typical antitrust case can light a clearer path
forward.
Part I defines commensurability and identifies the
commensurability myth in antitrust law, revealing its origins and
illustrating its continued prominence in antitrust discourse. It then
contrasts antitrust with two other areas of law—constitutional law and
administrative law—where commensurability problems are confronted
head-on. Part II then illustrates the incommensurability problem that
pervades § 1 analysis, using cases to illustrate the myth and its
consequences. Part III identifies the distorting doctrines courts have
developed in response to the commensurability problem, doctrines that
have made antitrust less predictable and less fair. Finally, Part IV
outlines the doctrinal and institutional debates currently missing from
antitrust discourse that are inevitably raised by the commensurability
problem. A short conclusion follows.
I. INCOMMENSURABILITY IN ANTITRUST AND ELSEWHERE
Rhetoric of commensurability is common in antitrust case law
generally and § 1 standards specifically. It is implicit in frequentlyinvoked images of “net” effect on competition, and in the idea that a
restriction’s ultimate effect is either to promote or to suppress
competition. This Part identifies these themes, traces their origins, and
illustrates their continued dominance.
In Section A, I define what I mean by commensurate and
incommensurate, because these terms are often used—in philosophy
and law—to describe subtly different phenomena. Armed with a
workable definition of commensurability, Section B then sketches the
history of the commensurability myth and its current status in
antitrust jurisprudence. Section C further highlights the
commensurability myth by presenting contrasting areas of law where
the commensurability problem is addressed more openly than in
antitrust.

8
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A. What is Commensurability?
In this Article I do not use “incommensurable” in its strongest
philosophical sense, which would apply only to values or objects that
cannot ever be compared or traded off in a rational manner.14 Rather, I
call “incommensurate” those values that cannot be traded off without
appeal to another external set of values, some of which may be
controversial.15
For
example,
under
my
definition
of
“commensurability,” apples and oranges are incommensurate because
choosing between them requires developing a set of criteria—which
may be contested—for how to compare the fruits. But this does not
imply that apples and oranges can never be rationally compared. If, for
example, we could agree that sugar content was the most important
factor for comparison, with fiber to serve as a tie-breaker, a decision
maker could quite rationally compare apples and oranges. In contrast,
euros and dollars are, for my purposes, commensurable; there is a
standard rate, at any given time, by which one can be converted to the
other that leaves very little room for debate or judgment in the
calculation.16 The apples-and-oranges example requires judgment
about comparative criteria, and the euros-and-dollars does not.
I do not dispute that markets are capable of making otherwise
incommensurate values—such as product quality, nutritional value,
personal pleasure, or self-esteem—commensurate with money.17 Nor do
I argue that such conversions are illegitimate and undesirable; indeed,
antitrust is premised on the traditional free market principle that
consumers, by purchasing according to their own idiosyncratic
preferences, should set the price for goods under competitive conditions.
Thus when I argue that quality and price are incommensurate, I do not
mean that they cannot be made commensurate by market forces.
I mean that in the typical antitrust case, consumer preferences
about intangibles such as quality and variety are unobservable, either
because the defendant is making a counterfactual claim (“without this
14. See Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169,
1172 (1998) (defining incommensurability as incomparability, which precludes justified choice).
15. Cf. Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare, Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1998) (“[T]wo goods can always be ranked on some scale.” (emphasis added)).
16. Note that my definition of commensurability is a question of degree, since it is possible
that some people may dispute which conversion rate to use—that posted by the U.S. Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, or some third source. My point is that some conversions
between values require relatively little judgment. When the freedom embodied in that judgment
is sufficiently small (and where that threshold lies is undoubtedly context-dependent), one may
call the values “commensurate.”
17. See generally Craswell, supra note 15 (arguing against the notion that idiosyncratic
utility and risks resulting from consumer choices are incommensurable with money).
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restriction, quality would suffer”) or because data on consumer behavior
is unavailable, too costly to collect, or unreliable. In other words, the
values as they are presented to a court are incommensurate. In the
typical antitrust case, the judge, not the consumer, is in the position of
trading off values for which there is no uncontroversial conversion rate.
Judges, just like consumers, can and do make judgments between these
incommensurate values and so, in the philosophical sense, make them
commensurate again. The commensurability myth is that those choices,
because they aim to maximize a seemingly unitary goal, such as
consumer welfare or competition, can be made without reliance on
contested (at best) or idiosyncratic (at worst) value judgments.
B. The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust:
Origins and Modern Manifestations
The roots of the commensurability myth can be found in early
Sherman Act cases, but it is the rhetoric of the Chicago School
revolution that firmly entrenched the myth in modern antitrust law and
policy. Thanks to a reordering of antitrust priorities in the 1970s and
1980s, heavily influenced by Professor Robert Bork, the modern
consensus among courts is that antitrust vindicates economic goals
alone, not social or welfare goals unrelated to competition or
efficiency.18 This realignment led to what many applaud as the
rationalization of antitrust law, with economic analysis playing a
starring role.19 But a common error among those embracing the
economic paradigm is to assume that when economics won out as the
dominant mode of antitrust analysis, we solved the commensurability
problem once and for all.
In an article that would become a lodestar of the economic
revolution of antitrust, Professor Bork identified a virtue of the wealth
maximization paradigm of antitrust: avoiding value judgments. His

18. See Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 833 (discussing the “enduring consensus” that antitrust
serves only economic goals). Some critics have argued that antitrust should be, and perhaps once
was, designed to trade off disparate values such as fairness and welfare or concentrations of
political power and production efficiency, Louis Brandeis being perhaps the most prominent figure
holding this view. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 66
(2013) (observing that Brandeis espoused “a view of antitrust that looks beyond the efficiency
effects of a particular combination or restraint to the broader social effects of domination of the
market by a few, large entities”). These arguments, although sometimes still made from a position
critical of the modern-day antitrust paradigm, have not had much traction in courts since the
1970s. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein.
19. See, e.g., David L. Meyer, We Should Not Let the Ongoing Rationalization of Antitrust
Lead to the Marginalization of Antitrust, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2008) (characterizing
the realignment of antitrust around economic principles as “highly beneficial”).
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language was emphatic, and is now archetypal of the many judicial
opinions endorsing the commensurability myth:
Because [antitrust] serves the single, unchanging value of wealth maximization it does
not require the courts to choose or weigh ultimate values in the decision of individual
cases or in the continuing evolution of doctrine. Neither are the courts involved in making
comparisons of and choices between persons and groups of persons.20

His principle of wealth maximization, which he equated with consumer
welfare,21 promised to save antitrust from value judgments
altogether.22
Professor Bork’s singular focus on consumer welfare as the
guiding goal of antitrust thus offered to transcend ideology at a time
when antitrust was seen as an excessively political game that “the
government always wins.”23 The concern for small competitors and
fairness in competition that had dominated antitrust litigation, at least
according to Professor Bork, made for unstructured choices for which
there was “no social science, no set of criteria, which could guide the
choice in the particular case.”24 His was a message of judicial
minimalism that was particularly attractive to judges and enforcers
because it allowed them the legitimacy of using science instead of
judgment.25 In Professor Bork’s words, the adoption of the economic
standard in the 1970s transformed antitrust from “social policy” to
“merely law.”26
20. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 838 (1965).
21. See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 991 (2002)
(“[Bork] championed total wealth maximization . . . as the goal of antitrust, although he
confusingly labeled this goal ‘consumer welfare.’ ”).
22. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, 10 (1966) (criticizing Learned Hand as assuming a “value-choosing role” in Alcoa and Associated
Press).
23. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency
and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 217–18 (2010)
(“The Court had read into the Sherman Act an assortment of vague and, ironically, anticompetitive social and political goals, such as protecting small traders from their larger,
impersonal (and more efficient) rivals.”).
24. Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
242, 246 (1967).
25. See Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 835 (2014) (noting that Professor Bork’s emphasis on consumer
welfare “reduced antitrust law to an elegant and precise formula that ostensibly could be applied
with consistency, accountability, and scientific rigor”); Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 829; George
L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox: An Essay in Honor of Robert H. Bork,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 458, 461 (2008) (noting that Bork’s Antitrust Paradox “explains
why the consumer welfare standard for antitrust law provides a consistent, normatively
defensible, and politically removed standard for decision by courts”).
26. See BORK, supra note 13, at ix–x.
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When courts adopted Professor Bork’s singular focus on
economic effects, they also accepted his rhetoric of commensurability,
and the myth was born. Antitrust legal opinions since then are rife with
characterizations of § 1 liability that imply symmetry between pro- and
anticompetitive effects. Courts will often discuss the “net” competitive
effect of a restriction,27 a concept that is encouraged by the oft-quoted
language from Chicago Board of Trade that “the true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition.”28 Interpreting the Rule of Reason to be an
inquiry into net effects is a reasonable understanding of this language,
since if a restriction can suppress or promote “competition,” it would
seem that “competition” has a single meaning or value that can be
increased or destroyed. The Court’s language in its 1999 opinion in
California Dental Association v. FTC29 is typical, and has been quoted
repeatedly since then: “the [challenged] restrictions might plausibly be
thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all
on competition.”30
In addition to ubiquitous judicial references to “net” competitive
effects, cases often identify antitrust as serving a single goal—always a
variation of economic efficiency, competition, or wealth maximization.
It has become so mainstream to simplify antitrust policy in this manner
as to be taken for granted. Thus, the references to the singlemindedness of antitrust policy are usually off-hand: “the sole aim of
antitrust legislation is to protect competition”31 is typical. And it is
unexceptional to begin a sentence in an antitrust case with something
like the following clause: “Assuming as I must that the sole goal of
antitrust is efficiency or, put another way, the maximization of total
societal wealth . . . .”32

27. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011)
(suggesting analysis of an agreement should look to whether it “might plausibly be thought to have
a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition” (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999))); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508
(4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff must show that the net effect of a challenged restraint is harmful to
competition.”).
28. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). This language is quoted
in hundreds of federal antitrust cases. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 n.10
(2010); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963); United States v. Brown Univ.,
5 F.3d 658, 668 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 853 F.
Supp. 837, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
29. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
30. Id. at 771.
31. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
32. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Courts so enthusiastically embraced Professor Bork’s invitation
to rationalize antitrust law that they overlooked a key exaggeration in
his claim. Adopting economic efficiency as the single goal of antitrust
law and policy may have settled much of the ideological dispute in
antitrust, but it did not eliminate all important value judgments in its
application. And some modern scholars have also encouraged the myth.
For example, in a 2013 article, Professor Thomas B. Nachbar invokes
commensurability:
Another major benefit of a singular focus on efficiency is its compatibility with the kind
of balancing called for by the rule of reason. Any restraint can be broken down into a
number of effects, and economics renders those effects perfectly commensurable, and
hence balanceable. Effects on efficiency can be re-stated as scalars, which vastly simplifies
rule-of-reason balancing.33

These proclamations have led courts to (at least claim to) avoid
value judgments in antitrust cases. For example, in the much-maligned
Topco34 case that held a horizontal geographic restriction on
competition to be illegal, the Supreme Court emphasized its “inability
to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one
sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another
sector.”35 Likewise, the Court has declared that “it is not to decide
whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the
interest of the members of an industry . . . . [T]hat policy decision has
been made by the Congress.”36 These statements of judicial
incompetence and congressional intent emphasize not only that courts
need not—but that they should not—weigh incommensurate
competitive values.
C. Incommensurability in Other Areas of Law
Two other areas of law, constitutional law and administrative
law, face significant commensurability problems and, for the most part,
address these problems more explicitly than antitrust. In these areas of
law, anxiety about incommensurate balancing leads to thoughtful
debates about the appropriate weight given each side of the scale. To be
sure, the values traded off in these kinds of cases are more disparate—
and incomparable—than those in the antitrust context. But as the next
Part illustrates, value judgments are unavoidable in antitrust, albeit
among a narrower set of interests. Thus, the maturity of debates about

33.
34.
35.
36.

Nachbar, supra note 18, at 64.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Id. at 609–10.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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disparate values in administrative and constitutional law can
illuminate the near total absence of similar debates about competitive
values in antitrust jurisprudence.
1. Incommensurability in Constitutional Law
In constitutional law, balancing is a commonly used metaphor
for what courts do in protecting individual rights against legitimate
governmental interests in welfare, safety, and social order. Thus,
judicial opinions deciding the constitutionality of a state statute
potentially limiting privacy address the state’s interest and the
individual privacy interests in turn, rather than casting the inquiry into
a “net” effects analysis on a unitary goal such as happiness or welfare.37
There is no pretense that “net” is a term that makes sense in the context
of balancing a private right against a public good, even though judges
must and do trade off one for the other.38
The nakedness of the commensurability problem means that
constitutional scholars and courts debate the incommensurate values
at stake. For example, there is a particularly robust debate in the First
Amendment context about when an individual’s speech interest may be
outweighed by an unrelated state interest.39 Likewise, scholars and
judges frequently theorize about how safety and privacy should be
balanced in Fourth Amendment cases.40 These debates help expose
disagreement about the right way to trade off effects, and also help to
get the balance “right” by approximating a political or academic
consensus about incommensurate values where it exists.

37. Scholars have noted that incommensurability results when you trade off a right against
a state interest. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 794 (1994).
38. First Amendment cases often ask courts to trade off an individual’s interest in free speech
against the government’s interest in social order and safety. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1233, 1270 n.132 (2004) (discussing the legitimacy of weighing the government’s interest in safety
and social order against First Amendment concerns (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 60–64 (1973))). Similarly, Fourth Amendment cases trade off interests in privacy for police
interests in solving crimes and keeping the peace.
39. See Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1022, 1045–46 (1978) (discussing the potential conflicts between the constitutional right to free
press and the right to a fair trial, and suggesting that the weight attributed to each value by the
Court during the balancing process is “subject to differences of view”).
40. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 39–46
(2013) (discussing how balancing may be better calibrated in the Fourth Amendment context);
Laura A. Lundquist, Weighing the Factors of Drug Testing for Fourth Amendment Balancing, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1151, 1152–54 (1992) (suggesting a framework for balancing Fourth
Amendment concerns in drug testing cases).
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In some cases, the difficulty or impropriety of balancing
incommensurate values leads scholars and judges to conclude that
balancing is not appropriate.41 In these cases, a critic may advocate for
doctrinal solutions that avoid balancing or that give the task to a more
fitting decisionmaker. For example, dissenting in a dormant Commerce
Clause case challenging a state’s law tolling the statute of limitations
for out-of-state businesses, Justice Scalia criticized as incoherent the
majority’s “balancing” of the in-state and out-of-state interests at stake:
Having evaluated the interests on both sides . . . roughly . . . , the court then proceeds to
judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called “balancing,” but the scale
analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate.
It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.42

To Justice Scalia, such a task is unbecoming to a federal judge and more
appropriately addressed by Congress.43 Such criticisms of
incommensurate balancing expose its difficulties and risks, and
underline the need for comparative institutional analysis.
2. Incommensurability in Administrative Law
In regulation through the administrative state, incommensurate
balancing often takes the form of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit
analysis is different from constitutional balancing—which never really
claims to solve the incommensurability problem—because the aim of
cost-benefit analysis is to reduce apples and oranges to a commensurate
unit (dollars) and so to approximate an apples-to-apples comparison.
Thus, cost-benefit analysis is an acknowledgement both that the values
traded off in administrative regulation are more commensurate than in
41. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 944–45 (1987). Justice Hugo Black was famous for rejecting the notion of balancing in
First Amendment cases. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional adjudication under the balancing method becomes simply a matter
of this Court's deciding for itself which result in a particular case seems . . . the more acceptable
governmental policy and then stating the facts in such a way that the considerations in the balance
lead to the result.”); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 164 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to “abandon what [he] consider[ed] to be the dangerous
constitutional doctrine of ‘balancing’ ”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 68 (1961) (Black &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (accusing the majority of pushing balancing “to the limit of its logic”);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree that
laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial
balancing process.”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175–77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring)
(arguing that balancing imperils individual liberty); see also Henkin, supra note 39, at 1023 (“The
most eminent critic of balancing, all know, was Justice Hugo Black . . . .”).
42. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (citation
omitted).
43. Id.
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the constitutional context (because they can be approximated in the
same unit of measure) and that they are not entirely commensurate
(otherwise agencies would not bother with the complicated and
contested task of reducing costs and benefits to monetary terms).
This explicit process of conversion from incommensurate to
commensurate is a source of lively controversy, as it should be. There
are vigorous debates about the dollar value of social or moral values,
such as human life or environmental health, to which scholars bring
many tools from empirical economic modeling to moral theory.44 There
is likewise debate in many areas of regulation about whether converting
some values to a dollar scale (and therefore cost-benefit analysis in the
first place) is ever an appropriate exercise.45
The sophistication of academic debates about cost-benefit
analysis reveals the benefits of explicit engagement with
incommensurability problems. For example, in monetizing the value of
life and health, some scholars hold that discounting future benefits is
inappropriate and leads to anti-regulation cost-benefit analyses.46
Others hold that discounting is an appropriate measure.47 An agency’s
choice to discount, and by how much, must confront this debate and its
moral and political implications, leading to better, or at least more
legitimate, decisionmaking. Similarly, some scholars argue that costbenefit analysis in its most common form does not account for
adaptation—by individuals and firms—to regulation, but it can and
should be calibrated to measure regulatory costs and benefits that
reflect these adjustments.48 Other scholars more critical of cost-benefit
analysis argue that it is categorically inappropriate in a particular
circumstance, or argue that it has systematically favored politically
conservative perspectives.49 All of these debates reveal the value
44. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG., Jan.–Feb.
1981, at 33; James V. DeLong et al., Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Replies to Steven Kelman,
REG., Mar.–Apr. 1981, at 39.
45. Kelman, supra note 44, at 33; see Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388–89 (1981) (arguing against the use of cost-benefit
analysis in justifying private law rules).
46. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 107–17 (2008).
47. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
RISK 55 (1992) (“[T]here is no evidence to indicate that we should use a different rate of discount
when weighting the long-term health benefits of policies that affect life extension as compared
with other benefit and cost components that these policies may have.”). Likewise, the OMB
guidelines approve of future discounting. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-431–36 (Sep. 9, 2003) (discussing the use of discount rates).
48. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 85–93, 131–43.
49. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 7–12 (2004).
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judgments inherent in cost-benefit analysis, value judgments made
inevitable by the incommensurability problem cost-benefit analysis is
designed to address. This transparency allows for better engagement
with, and attention to, the motivations and biases that agencies bring
to regulation.
II. THE INCOMMENSURATE VALUES OF COMPETITION
In this Part, I argue that whether the Rule of Reason is seen as
vindicating consumer welfare or competition as a process, most § 1 cases
must tackle incommensurability between pro- and anticompetitive
effects. There is almost unanimous consensus among modern
interpreters of the Sherman Act that its purpose is to further economic
welfare by protecting competition.50 There is, however, some debate
about whether the correct welfare standard under the Sherman Act is
total welfare, which would include producer and consumer surplus, or
consumer welfare alone, which is typically equated with consumer
surplus.51 Under a total welfare standard, antitrust laws would allow
restrictions on trade that harm consumers, as long as they benefit
producers by a greater amount.52 Under a consumer welfare standard,
any restriction that harms consumers, whatever its effect on producers,
would be condemned under the antitrust laws.53
This article assumes that the appropriate standard is consumer
welfare, for two reasons. First, consumer welfare is the more dominant
paradigm, especially in the courts, but even among scholars. Second, it
is the easier case for the commensurability myth and so gives my critics
the benefit of the doubt. In other words, if there is significant
50. See supra note 12.
51. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 137 (“Rather, today, there are two major groups of thought:
one argues that the term should mean ‘consumer surplus,’ and the other asserts that the
appropriate meaning is ‘total surplus’ or ‘aggregate welfare.’ ”); Salop, supra note 11, at 336 (“Some
commentators favor the aggregate economic welfare standard . . . . [O]ther commentators favor
what I will refer to as the true consumer welfare standard.”). Consumer surplus is typically defined
as the aggregate difference between consumers’ willingness to pay and the prevailing price. In a
simple market where one price prevails, consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve
above price. Similarly, producer welfare is defined as the aggregate difference between price and
marginal cost. Again, in a simple market where one price prevails, producer welfare can be defined
as the area above the supply curve (marginal cost curve) and below price. See Orbach, supra note
12, at 140, for a simple graphical illustration of these concepts.
52. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 11, at 483 (advocating for a total welfare standard that
would deem legal a restraint that benefits the winners more than it harms the losers); Salop, supra
note 11, at 336 (“[T]he aggregate economic welfare standard would condemn conduct only if it
decreases the sum of the welfare of consumers (i.e., buyers) plus producers (i.e., sellers plus
competitors); and without regard to any wealth transfers.”).
53. Salop, supra note 11, at 336 (“[T]he true consumer welfare standard would condemn
conduct if it reduces the welfare of buyers, irrespective of its impact on sellers.”).
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incommensurability among pro- and anticompetitive consumer welfare
effects (as I intend to show), then the problem must be even worse
among producer and consumer welfare effects.
Section A provides a typology of the incommensurate tradeoffs
courts are typically asked to make in Rule of Reason cases. The
incommensurate comparisons are loosely grouped into three categories:
tradeoffs between quantitative and qualitative measures of welfare,
tradeoffs between welfare now and welfare in the future, and welfare
tradeoffs between different groups of consumers. Section B then
explores three categories of restraints often challenged under the Rule
of Reason, illustrating that in the typical case, the pro- and
anticompetitive effects offered by the litigants trade in different units
of measure.
A. Types of Incommensurate Tradeoffs
A consumer welfare standard, as it is now understood,54 would
assess a restriction’s effect on consumer surplus, or the aggregate
difference between price and each consumers’ willingness to pay.55 This
can be simplified graphically by using a two-dimensional supply and
demand curve: consumer welfare is the area below the demand curve
and above price. If a restriction enlarges this area, then it has the effect
of improving consumer welfare.56 But the mathematical and graphical
simplicity of using two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves to
illustrate consumer surplus57 oversimplifies the concept. There are
many different factors that influence a consumer’s willingness to pay,
meaning that a single restriction can simultaneously offer benefits and
54. There is significant controversy over what Robert Bork meant by using this term in THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987) (noting that
Bork’s usage of the term “as a synonym for economic efficiency [was] an unnecessary and confusing
redundancy” and contending that the “term consumer welfare is the most abused term in modern
antitrust analysis”); Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 828 (noting the substantial uncertainty as to
what Bork meant by “consumer welfare”); Orbach, supra note 12, at 136 (“The Antitrust Paradox
ended the debate over the stated goals of antitrust law and opened a new debate over the meaning
of the term ‘consumer welfare.’ Antitrust scholars have known for many years that Bork was
‘confused’ when he used the term ‘consumer welfare.’ ”). Without taking a stand on that debate, I
adopt the now-dominant use of that term—the aggregate consumer surplus in a market for a
particular product.
55. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 134 n.1 (noting that while the term remains largely
ambiguous in antitrust, it has a defined meaning in economics as “the benefits a buyer derives
from the consumption of goods and services.”).
56. See id. at 140 (demonstrating this point with a simple graph).
57. This method of illustrating consumer surplus is ubiquitously used in antitrust casebooks,
treatises, and even opinions. See, e.g., NaBanco v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1266–67
(S.D. Fla. 1984) (illustrating merchant willingness to pay based on a series of demand curves).
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costs to a single consumer, or benefit some consumers while harming
others. To make matters even more complicated, a restriction may
inflict harm on a consumer today but promise him benefits in the future.
The result is that in most Rule of Reason cases, the “net” effect on
consumer welfare cannot be ascertained because what consumers gain
and what they lose by a restriction are not presented to the court in
commensurate units of measure.
1. Quantitative Versus Qualitative Aspects of Consumer Welfare
The two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves that dominate
antitrust textbooks depict only two axes of product attributes: quantity
and price. This abstraction makes clean and obvious the nature of
consumer surplus: it is the excess in consumers’ aggregate willingness
to pay above the price offered by the market. But the supply-anddemand graph is a simplification—albeit a very useful one—of a more
holistic concept. Price and quantity are not the only relevant
dimensions of a market, nor is antitrust so limited in the aspects of
consumer welfare that it can consider. There are two major ways in
which antitrust doctrine accounts for consumer welfare beyond these xand-y axes of price and output. First, and most importantly, the law
recognizes that consumer surplus is a function not only of price and
output but also of product quality and the buying experience, broadly
defined.58 Second, courts recognize that consumers intrinsically value
choice and variety in markets.59 All of these values—price, output,
quality, choice, and variety—are appropriate measures of consumer
welfare, and all potentially play a role in any § 1 case.
a. Quantitative Measures of Welfare: Price and Output
Although the two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves
typically used to illustrate the economics of antitrust are oversimplified,
there is a good reason why those are the two dimensions chosen for the
simplification. Price is an essential element of consumer welfare; all
things being equal, consumers want to pay less for the same products.60
Output is likewise an essential element of consumer welfare because it

58. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882–83 (2007)
(describing how Leegin’s business model focused on a high-quality and personalized shopping
experience).
59. See id. at 927 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that providing consumers with choices is a
basic objective of antitrust law).
60. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1426 (noting that it is safe to assume that individuals
“prefer to pay a lower price” and “prefer more of a good rather than less”).
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is the flip side of price; holding all else constant, a price increase will
reduce output, and a reduction in output will increase price.61
Additionally, price and output are relatively easily quantified, and so
present fewer measurement problems than other dimensions of
consumer welfare. Thus, price and quantity form the bread and butter
of consumer welfare analysis.
b. Qualitative Measures of Welfare: Quality and Variety
All things being equal, consumers want to pay less for more. But
the modifying phrase, “all things being equal,” is important in
recognizing the sacrifices made for the simplicity of the price-quantity
paradigm. The price-quantity model holds constant product quality,
which has obvious implications for consumer welfare. If quality changes
too, then the welfare effect of a price or output shift can no longer be
taken for granted. And outside of hard-core cartel activity, price
changes are usually accompanied by changes in product quality or the
addition or subtraction of product features.
In a perfect world, quality effects could be quantified and made
commensurate with price. If consumers perceive a quality improvement
in a product, then they will be willing to pay more for it. Economists can
in theory measure this quality premium and turn the price term in the
quantity-price paradigm into “quality-adjusted price.”62 This could
address the commensurability problem; if quality deterioration or
improvement could be captured by the “price” variable, then the twodimensional price-output paradigm would account for consumer
welfare impacted by quality issues. But there are two reasons why
using quality-adjusted price is unlikely to fully solve the
commensurability problem in antitrust litigation.
Data on how consumers react to quality changes is often lacking,
either because the defendant is making a hypothetical claim about
quality deterioration in a world without the challenged restriction, or
because the data is too costly to collect. Further, parsing out the effect
of multiple quality changes or the addition or subtraction of features—
because rarely are products changed only in one respect at a time—can
be an econometric challenge that often results in less-than-reliable

61. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 152 (“In antitrust economics, price and output are variables
that tend to have a simple inverse relationship.”).
62. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
“quality-adjusted price” as a variable of consumer welfare); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D.
150, 164 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (discussing an expert economist’s report describing the effect of
competition on quality-adjusted price); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1306
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (discussing quality-adjusted price).
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answers. The result is that rarely are parties to an antitrust suit able
to make undisputed claims about changes in quality.63 More often,
claims about product quality are addressed with judges’ gut-level
instincts about what consumers want from their products. This may be
appropriate given the lack of hard data, and is probably preferable to a
system that ignores the effects of product quality on consumer welfare.
But it does create an apples-to-oranges problem in trading off the
welfare effects of restraints of trade aimed at improving product
quality.
Another limiting assumption of the quantitative price-quantity
model is that the product in question is homogenous and fungible, and
therefore the model does not account for the intrinsic value of choice or
variety. If a market consists of several products that compete with each
other but that are also different in salient ways, then a single twodimensional supply-and-demand curve will not adequately capture the
effect of competition or the welfare implications of the market. Part of
this problem could be addressed by summing aggregate consumer
welfare by drawing separate curves for each differentiated product and
adding up the consumer welfare from each. But even this burdensome
exercise would not capture the inherent value in choice and variety on
the market. Consumers like product variety not only because it allows
them to satisfy their idiosyncratic tastes (which would be captured by
summing the curves of individual products), but also because they find
utility in having and exercising choice in making purchases (which
would not). Indeed, antitrust can and does recognize that consumers
benefit from choice,64 even if it creates a commensurability problem
with more easily-quantified values such as price and quantity.
2. Consumer Welfare Now or Later: Innovation in
Products and Distribution
Consumer welfare also has an intertemporal dimension,
creating a commensurability problem: How should courts trade off
future consumer welfare gains for present welfare losses? The pricequantity model, even if it is able to capture quality through qualityadjusted price, is limited because it is static in time—it gives only a
snapshot of consumer welfare. It cannot capture the competitive and
welfare effects of competitor entry, product innovation, or

63. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 1969, 1980–81(2015).
64. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(discussing the market benefits of patented products where consumers have multiple choices).
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improvements to production and distribution over time, yet consumers
undoubtedly derive value from these dynamic market effects. A market
that maximizes efficiency now but does not incentivize research and
development is obviously less beneficial to consumer welfare than one
that both promotes efficiency given the present state of technology and
induces investment in lowering costs and inspiring demand.65
If antitrust vindicates consumer welfare, then it should take
account of innovation and other intertemporal dimensions of welfare.
For the most part, antitrust seeks to maximize short-run welfare
because future benefits are thought to be too speculative to justify
known and quantifiable harm to consumers.66 But antitrust’s myopia is
not absolute. The Supreme Court itself has invoked the possibility of
future payoffs to consumers as a justification for antitrust rules.67 And
in the lower courts, defendants can and do raise arguments about future
consumer benefit, such as innovation and competitor entry, which can
tip the antitrust judgment in their favor.68

65. Hearing on Antitrust and the New Economy Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n,
109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of M. Howard Morse, Partner & Co-Chair, Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP
Antitrust
Group)
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/
Statement_Morse_revd.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TKQ-W7GF] (“Everyone should understand that
small increases in productivity from innovation dwarf even significant reductions in static
efficiency over time.” (citing F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE 31, 613 (3d ed. 1990))); Orbach, supra note 12, at 157 n.136 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 1 (1995)).
66. Cf. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1975) (suggesting a general concern for
short run, rather than long-term, consumer welfare in monopolization cases). The Court’s holding
in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013)—that some reverse-payment settlements could
violate the antitrust laws—could be interpreted as rejecting innovation arguments in the antitrust
context.
67. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”).
68. See Gen. Motors Corp. 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent order) (allowing a joint venture
between GM and Toyota in part because it would allow GM to learn Japanese production
techniques). For an example of a case identifying innovation as a policy goal of antitrust, see Atari
Games, 897 F.2d at 1576. For a policy statement identifying innovation as a goal of antitrust, see
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1 (1995) (describing a goal of antitrust to be “to promote innovation”).
For academic discussions of antitrust and innovation, see Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative
Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, in 59 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION 105, 115–16 (1969) (arguing that
there is an optimal market size for innovation, and that antitrust can be used to promote it);
Brodley, supra note 54, at 1025 (“[T]he promotion of production and innovation efficiency should
be the first economic goal of antitrust.”); Orbach supra note 12, at 156–58 (discussing the
importance of innovation in antitrust).
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If antitrust is interpreted as vindicating consumer welfare over
the long (or even medium) run, then courts encounter commensurability
problems.69 They must compare a bird in the hand to two in the bush,
as future benefits are necessarily uncertain. As in other areas of welfare
analysis, discounting could be used to reduce future benefits to present
units, but the nature of innovation and competitor entry is sufficiently
mercurial as to make future discounting almost arbitrary.70
3. Interconsumer Tradeoffs
Despite Professor Bork’s statement that an economic welfare
standard for antitrust would allow courts to avoid “making comparisons
of and choices between persons and groups of persons,”71 resolving a
Rule of Reason case often does involve at least implicitly elevating the
interests of one kind of consumer over another. A purely quantitative
change to consumer welfare—such as may be effected by a price
reduction holding quality and other intangibles constant—is likely to
affect all consumers similarly, or at least in the same direction. But
other dimensions of consumer welfare are likely to affect different
consumers differently.
For example, quality and feature changes are likely to affect
different consumers differently.72 Quality improvements or the addition
of product features, unlike price changes, are valued idiosyncratically,
meaning that a single quality change may improve consumer welfare
for one set of consumers while doing nothing for another set. Even if
quality changes were quantifiable, econometric analysis could provide
no guidance about how to balance a price increase that affects all
consumers against a quality improvement that only some consumers
demand.73 Here the apples-to-oranges problem is larger than merely a

69. Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 282 (noting that “the short-term benefits of lower prices
and greater choice are not readily commensurable with the long-term benefits of higher incentives
to invest in invention”); cf. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 238–39
(2008) (there is often a tension between long-run consumer welfare and short-run allocative
efficiency).
70. Cf. Brodley, supra note 54, at 1029 (discussing the difficulties in measuring future
benefits from innovation).
71. Bork, supra note 20, at 838.
72. Cf. Don Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Inframarginal Consumers and the Per Se
Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 156–57 (1988) (discussing the possibility
that marginal and inframarginal consumers are affected differently by product quality).
73. Cf. Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448 (“[I]t is probably fair to say that the mainstream of
welfare economics . . . has accepted the proposition that there is no meaningful way to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility.”); Stucke, supra note 3, at 1442 (“In balancing pro- and
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lack of data; comparison of the competitive costs and benefits would
require a theory about how to trade off benefits to one kind of consumer
against harm to another.74 Likewise, consumers are likely to derive
idiosyncratic value from having greater variety and choice in a market.
And innovation is especially likely to affect different consumers
differently, both because consumers are likely to have different
preferences for innovative new products, and because the consumers
who benefit from innovation in the future may actually be different
people from the consumers of today.
Any model of antitrust that promotes economic efficiency—
which certainly describes the current antitrust model in the U.S.—
encounters interpersonal commensurability problems.75 But scholars
tend to only discuss interpersonal incommensurability when
defending76 or critiquing77 the status quo as opposed to a standard that
would promote wealth redistribution, which would involve even more
extreme interpersonal comparison problems. These discussions tend to
ignore that even the current economic efficiency paradigm requires a
variety of interpersonal tradeoffs, presenting a range of
commensurability problems. Some are relatively small, such as the
commensurability of a dollar to one consumer and a dollar to another,
and some are relatively large, such as the commensurability of an
additional product feature to one consumer versus another consumer.

anticompetitive effects, the fact finder does not consider whether one group bears the brunt of the
anticompetitive effects over time.”).
74. Craswell, supra note 15, at 1450 (“[W]elfare economics does not pretend to offer any
theory of how to justify decisions that affect more than one individual, if some individuals would
gain while others would lose.”).
75. Technically speaking, even price changes affect different consumers differently, since
welfare models based on individual utility curves are incapable of making interpersonal
comparisons—a dollar may have more marginal value to one consumer than another. Welfare
economists avoid this problem by assuming that the marginal value of a dollar is the same for
every consumer. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 235 (1985) (discussing the “constant dollar” assumption of the Chicago School model of
antitrust policy). The need for this (questionable) assumption suggests that every attempt to
measure welfare encounters and assumes away a commensurability problem. For an excellent
critique of the assumption of dollar-for-dollar commensurability, see id. at 235–37. This article
does not address this level of commensurability problems—which are prominent in the debate
about whether antitrust can or should serve redistributive goals—but rather accepts arguendo the
classic assumption that a dollar has equal value to every consumer. To do otherwise would be to
reject the economic welfare model of antitrust altogether.
76. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703–05
(1986) (arguing that recognizing wealth redistribution as a goal of antitrust would make the
interpersonal incommensurability problem even worse).
77. See Hovenkamp, supra note 75, at 235–37 (critiquing the notion that efficiency standard
for antitrust is apolitical, since accepting its “constant dollar” assumption is itself a policy choice).
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The difference in the magnitude of these commensurability problems
gets little attention in antitrust cases or scholarship.
Note that economic science offers little guidance when it comes
to making the interpersonal tradeoffs required by antitrust law. As
discussed above, quality and variety are features that can, at least in
theory, be measured econometrically, because markets are theoretically
capable of translating them into a measure commensurate with price.
Of course, the qualifier “in theory” matters a great deal in the antitrust
context, because often there is little data available to quantify a
qualitative change. Likewise, the presence of data about how likely
innovations are to occur, and how consumers would value such
innovations would, in theory—but often only in theory—address the
commensurability problem presented by intertemporal tradeoffs. But
the problem is even deeper than a lack of data in the case of
interpersonal welfare tradeoffs, where economics as a science has little
to offer.78 Such judgments—often required by law—are left to other,
non-scientific decisionmaking processes.
B. Restraints of Trade Implicating Incommensurate Values
Courts considering § 1 cases are routinely asked to make
tradeoffs between values that are, as presented in litigation,
incommensurate. This section explores three categories of cases—which
cover the majority of Rule of Reason cases—in which
incommensurability is often a problem. For each category I describe the
restraint challenged, its typical competitive effects, and the
commensurability problem it tends to raise. I then provide examples
showing the difficulty courts face when deciding these cases while
attempting to adhere to the myth of commensurability.
1. Vertical Restraints on Resale
Today, it is generally accepted that restraints on vertical resale,
such as resale price maintenance (RPM), can have consumer welfareenhancing effects by improving the quality of the buying experience and
stimulating the provision of services along with the product.79 Vertical

78. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448 (noting that “economics can supply no single metric
by which gains and losses to different individuals can be ranked”).
79. For a full description of how restrictions on intrabrand competition can enhance
interbrand competition, see Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–
92 (2007) (discussing the “free-rider” problem that results in the under-provision of ancillary
services and promotional efforts at the retail level, and how vertical restrictions such as resale
price maintenance can address it).
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restraints can solve a market failure associated with free riding, which
can lead to less-than-optimal provision of ancillary sales services
provided with the product.80 These restrictions suppress intrabrand
competition (competition among dealers for sales of the same brand) to
induce robust interbrand competition (competition among different
brands) in the form of better customer service, more attractive displays,
and other ancillary sales services.
Of course these improvements in the shopping experience can
yield consumer welfare benefits, in the form of product quality (if the
“product” is defined as including ancillary services), choice, and variety
of buying experiences. It can also promote innovation in sales and
distribution methods. But there is also significant evidence that
practices like RPM raise consumer prices,81 which by itself would
reduce consumer welfare. Often we cannot know the “but for” prices
that consumers would pay for the product with and without the
restriction (and thus with and without the enhanced purchase
experience), so a court cannot assume that the increase in price provides
a conversion rate for the enhanced consumer experience. Quality,
variety, innovation, and price are all important dimensions of consumer
welfare, but they are not directly commensurable.
Competition itself could alleviate the commensurability
problem. As Professor Bork pointed out, if RPM is being used in a purely
procompetitive manner—that is, if it is being used by manufacturers to
induce ancillary services that consumers demand—then courts will not
have to trade off price effects for those services.82 If some consumers do
not actually want to pay more for the services, then a competitor brand
will emerge that does not use RPM at all, but allows its goods to be sold
in “bargain basement” conditions. In this best-case scenario, consumers,
not judges, would decide between price and quality. And this best-case
scenario also means more choice and variety for the consumer.
But if resale price maintenance is being used in some of the
anticompetitive ways identified by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
80. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (noting that resale price maintenance may be justified
“because discounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture
some of the demand those services generate” (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 55 (1977))).
81. See, e.g., THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF ECONS., RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 160 (1983) (“[P]rice surveys
indicate that [resale price maintenance] in most cases increased the prices of products sold . . . .”);
Hearings on H.R. 2384 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 122 (1975) (statement of Keith I. Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Att’y
Gen.) (arguing that minimum resale price maintenance increased prices by 19% to 27%).
82. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 473 (1966).
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on RPM,83 then courts may be in a position of guessing whether the
price increase associated with resale price maintenance actually
reflects the value it provides consumers. For example, if a judge
suspects that RPM is being used to facilitate a retailer cartel, then lack
of competition among retailers would mean that consumers do not have
a meaningful choice between retail outlets. The assumption that
consumers are paying more because they want the associated services
is no longer justified, and courts are stuck balancing price against
quality. And certainly there is no reason to believe that all consumers
want the ancillary services, raising the specter of incommensurate
interpersonal welfare tradeoffs.
How these values should be traded off is highly controversial,
even among members of the Supreme Court. In Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania,84 the first vertical restraint case of the modern era, the Court
declared in a footnote that interbrand competition, rather than
intrabrand competition, was the primary goal of antitrust.85 This
assertion, often since repeated86 and rarely defended, provides no
normative justification for such a thumb on the scale, nor any guidance
for how to judge restrictions that offer minimal benefit to interbrand
competition at significant cost to intrabrand competition.87
Almost half the Court implicitly disagreed with Sylvania’s ipse
dixit in 2007’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,88
the case that reversed the century-old ban on resale price maintenance.
The Leegin majority emphasized resale price maintenance’s ability to
combat the free-rider problem and to encourage point-of-sale services

83. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94 (indicating that retail price maintenance can encourage
manufacturer and retailer cartels).
84. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
85. Id. at 52 n.19 (“Interbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law.”). The
case cites no authority for this proposition.
86. The footnote from Sylvania has been cited by the Supreme Court three times since, and
dozens of times in lower court opinions. See, e.g., Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., v. Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180 (2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 501 (1992);
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); Gorlick Distrib. Ctrs., LLC v.
Car Sound Exhaust Sys., 723 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2013); Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 227 (3d Cir. 2008); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164,
166 (3d Cir. 1979); Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19).
87. See Stucke, supra note 3, at 1442–43 (noting that in Leegin, “the Court willingly traded
off the reduction of intrabrand price competition,” and contrasting that holding with the logic of
Topco in which the Court refused to trade off intra- for interbrand competition because it found it
“beyond its competency and authority . . . ‘to determine the respective values of competition in
various sectors of the economy’ ”) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–
11 (1972)).
88. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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and promotion—benefits offered by increased interbrand competition.89
But Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, emphasized the cost of reduced
intrabrand competition, citing evidence that resale price maintenance
raised prices by 19% to 27%,90 increasing the average household’s
annual retail bills by $750 to $1,000.91 Such a price increase, of course,
could be compatible with enhanced overall consumer welfare if that
price increase was offset by a larger increase in consumer satisfaction
with the sales services and buying experience. The dissent was
skeptical that qualitative improvements made the price increase
worthwhile, but the majority did not seem to share this view by not
discussing the price increases directly. In essence, the majority and the
dissent made different judgments about how consumers value service
quality, the brand experience, product variety, and price.
2. Restraints Creating a “New Product”
Sometimes a market participant will restrain competition as an
ancillary effect of creating a “new product.” Defendants can raise “new
product” arguments—essentially that absent the competitive
restriction, consumers would be offered one less option and existing
products would face one less competitor—to save a restriction from per
se treatment and to defend it under the Rule of Reason. Most new
product cases stand or fall on whether the competitive restriction is
“reasonably necessary” to create the product,92 and this question, in
turn, often depends on an implicit tradeoff between the price effects of
a restriction and the new or unique character of the product. Because
parties rarely have data showing either how the restriction affects price
or how consumers value the new product, “new product” Rule of Reason
cases typically involve incommensurate tradeoffs.

89. The majority invoked the footnote from Sylvania, claiming that “antitrust laws are
designed primarily to protect interbrand competition,” and therefore these restraints should be
subject to Rule of Reason analysis. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895–96. Note that even the majority’s
position—which privileges inter- over intrabrand competition—does not totally avoid the
commensurability problem. By applying Rule of Reason analysis to vertical restraints rather than
declaring them per se legal, the Court implied that some restraints can be so harmful to intrabrand
competition as to outweigh any benefits to interbrand competition.
90. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 926.
92. See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health
Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 901–02 (2004); see also William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and
Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 785
(2001) (“Modern decisions have tolerated horizontal restraints when the restrictions are
reasonably necessary to facilitate collaboration that improves economic efficiency . . . .”).
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In NCAA v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents,93 the
Supreme Court confronted a new product argument that required just
such a tradeoff between incommensurate values. The defendant, the
NCAA, had imposed a set of rules on its university members’ college
football teams that severely restricted the number of games that each
team could televise.94 Several large schools with popular football teams,
including University of Oklahoma, filed suit arguing that the rules
imposed an illegal output restriction on television rights for their games
in violation of § 1. They claimed that absent the restriction, they could
sell many more games to television stations and receive more revenue
to benefit their football program.95
The NCAA defended the restriction as necessary to sustain
robust live attendance at games. The NCAA argued that to create the
popular product known as college football, many restrictions were in
order—from rules about amateur status to limitations on practice
time.96 The television restriction was of that order; robust attendance
at live games was, in the NCAA’s view, an essential element of the
character of college football.97 Allowing the few large schools with major

93. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
94. Id. at 93–94 (describing the NCAA “ground rules” as prohibiting any single team from
appearing on national television more than four times per two-year period, while also requiring
the television networks to broadcast at least eighty-two different teams during that period).
95. Id. at 128 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that without the restrictions, each institution
would be allowed to sell its television rights to any entity in a free market transaction, enabling
the large schools to capitalize on their additional value).
96. The NCAA Manual explains the role of amateur status as designed to maintain
intercollegiate sports as “an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports.” NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL
59
[hereinafter
NCAA
MANUAL],
http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D115JAN.pdf [http://perma.cc/X95X-V2QJ]; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.
Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (indicating that the NCAA rules are meant to “prevent
commercializing influences from destroying the unique ‘product’ of NCAA college football” and
should not be struck down by antitrust laws); Alan J. Meese, Competition and Market Failure in
the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1791 (2006) (noting that
“agreements regarding the academic qualifications of players both before and after their
admission, as well as agreements on the maximum level of compensation that schools could pay
such players for their services” are necessary to ensure the amateur character of college sports).
See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299,
1303, 1307 (1992) (finding instances in which courts have upheld precompetitive NCAA rules as
promoting the integrity of college football and public interest in the sport). But see Matthew J.
Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College Athletics: The Need to
Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the
21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (observing that the NCAA requires amateur
status to promote an image of academically-minded student athletes rather than professionals).
97. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984) (“[A] three-person
‘Television Committee’ . . . concluded that ‘television does have an adverse effect on college football

2016]

THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH

29

interest from television stations to dominate the airwaves on Saturday
afternoons would ruin the sport for everyone, and ultimately erode the
very qualities that made the sport so popular (and so in-demand by
television stations) in the first place. In welfare terms, this restriction,
like other NCAA rules, was necessary to create the “new product”98 that,
depending on the market definition, either created its own market with
its own consumer surplus,99 or competed with professional football and
so increased consumer surplus by offering consumers choice and by
exerting competitive pressure on pro football.
Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with a tradeoff between
incommensurate values: on the one hand, the restriction had obvious
negative effects on output if output was to be measured by televised
games.100 That certainly diminished one kind of consumer surplus. But
the restriction at least plausibly preserved the character of college
football, which is essentially an element of product quality.101 Thus, the
Court was asked to trade off the negative surplus associated with
diminished output with the positive surplus associated with augmented
quality.
The Court did not frame its decision in this way, rather it
attempted to avoid the commensurability problem altogether. The
Court dismissed the procompetitive argument as pretextual because
even the games that were televised under the plan were shown live,
coinciding with other untelevised football games. This suggested to the

attendance and unless brought under some control threatens to seriously harm the nation’s overall
athletic and physical system.’ ”).
98. Of course college football is not “new,” but the “new product” argument applies to actually
new products and products that could not exist but for the restriction.
99. Cf. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 227–28 (1990) (arguing that professional and amateur sports form
separate labor markets because professional sports do not offer the same educational
opportunities; professional eligibility requirements practically bar college-age players; and collegeaged athletes often lack the talent to immediately compete at the professional level); Daniel E.
Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86
OR. L. REV. 329, 360 n.125 (2007) (suggesting the possibility that “supporters of college teams
identify more with players who are also legitimate students,” which would create a line of
demarcation between professional and amateur football leagues).
100. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (“[T]he NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint
upon the operation of a free market, and the findings of the district court establish that it has
operated to raise prices and reduce output.”); Meese, supra note 96, at 1799.
101. Meese, supra note 96, at 1793 (“[R]estrictions on horizontal rivalry could actually improve
the quality of the product offered by the league and thereby enhance consumer welfare.”); Lazaroff,
supra note 99, at 339 (noting that the Court found price restraints, output restrictions, and
amateurism rules necessary “in order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’ ”
(quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102)).
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Court that the NCAA did not really care about live attendance.102 But
just because the rule did not go further and control the timing of
televised games—perhaps by delaying the broadcast of games until
after all live games were completed—does not mean that the NCAA’s
rule restriction on the number of televised games was unrelated to
preserving live attendance at games not shown on television.103 The
Court seemed to misunderstand the NCAA’s argument: fans would be
less likely to attend a less-popular team’s live game if they could stay
home and watch—for free—a more popular team’s game on TV. The
more of those games available on TV, the fewer fans attending live
games.
This mischaracterization of the NCAA’s argument allowed the
Court to express its condemnation in terms of output, and to appear to
dodge the quality claims at the heart of NCAA’s procompetitive
justification. The Court explained that “[i]f the NCAA’s television plan
produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan would increase output
and reduce the price of televised games.”104 But there was no question
that the restriction reduced televised output; the question was whether
this restriction on output also effected an increase in the quality of
college football viewed holistically, and whether the output restriction
was outweighed by these quality benefits. The Court’s ultimate
holding—condemning the restriction as violating § 1—was probably the
right answer given the severe output restriction it created and the
dubious benefit it offered to the “character” of college football. But by
failing to own up to the commensurability problem presented by the
case and implicitly resolved by its decision, the Court missed an
opportunity to shed light on how such tradeoffs ought to be struck in
antitrust.105
In Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting System
106
(BMI), another new product case, the Court faced a similar tradeoff
but concluded with a much more favorable view of the restriction. BMI,
102. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 116 (“The plan simply does not protect live attendance by ensuring
the games will not be shown on television at the same time as live events.”).
103. Id. at 115 (observing that the NCAA was worried “that fan interest in a televised game
may adversely affect ticket sales for games that will not appear on television”).
104. Id. at 114.
105. For cases challenging the NCAA’s amateurism rules—which present similar
commensurability problems—see Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992) (challenging
the NCAA’s “no-draft” eligibility rule); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988)
(alleging that NCAA rules “are designed to stifle competition”); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d
955, 962–63 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (challenging the NCAA’s rules restricting competition for men’s
football and basketball players); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(analyzing a challenge to the NCAA’s eligibility rules).
106. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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a defendant in the suit, operated a “ ‘clearing house’ for copyright
owners”107 that offered “blanket licenses” to television and radio
programs wishing to use songs composed by its thousands of members.
The “blanket license” product was thought to overcome the transaction
costs that had plagued the industry. Prior to the availability of the
blanket license, television and radio stations would have to contact and
negotiate with individual songwriters before playing their compositions
on the air; the difficulty of those negotiations and the low probability of
artists enforcing their copyrights through individual suits lead to
rampant copyright violations.108 The blanket license gave television
stations the right to use any of the songs in the BMI repertoire at any
time during a program, in exchange for a percentage of that program’s
revenues.109
CBS sued BMI, arguing that because BMI was acting as a joint
selling agency, the blanket license amounted to price fixing among its
thousands of songwriter members.110 The Court rejected that argument
and held that a per se rule was inappropriate because of the
procompetitive effects of the blanket license. The Court extolled the
virtues of the blanket license as providing a popular “new product”111
that benefited copyright licensees and songwriters alike, and improved
upon the atomistic market for song rights that was plagued with
market failures.112
Again the Court overlooked key features of the parties’
arguments in an effort to avoid the commensurability problem. CBS
was not asking for a return to a world without BMI and ASCAP acting
as clearinghouses (or joint selling agencies). CBS wanted BMI to offer
a different product, a “per use” license that would allow CBS to pay only
for those songs it used in the course of a program.113 In effect, CBS was

107. Id. at 5.
108. Cf. id. at 20 (noting that without the “blanket license,” individual transactions are
expensive and composers are singularly responsible for monitoring and enforcement of copyright).
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Again, the product was not “new”; ASCAP and BMI had been selling similar blanket
licenses for decades. Id. at 5–6. But it is a product that could not exist but for some restriction of
head-to-head songwriting competition, and so in that sense it is a “new” product relative to a
market where such a restriction is not allowed.
112. See id. at 21 (arguing that a bulk license is necessary to capture efficiencies, including
reduced costs for transacting and diminished need for extensive monitoring).
113. Brief for Respondent at 3, BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nos. 77-1578, 77-1583), 1978 WL
223669, at *3 (arguing that both BMI and ASCAP “have refused to license on a per-use basis, even
though it would be (i) feasible to do so (since they now distribute royalties to their members on
a per-use basis), and (ii) less restrictive than the blanket system (since it would permit direct
licensing to occur)”).
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arguing that the restriction—artists agreeing through BMI to offer only
the blanket license and not a per use license—was not reasonably
necessary to create the product, if the product were understood as the
right to indemnified spontaneous use of copyrighted material during a
broadcast. CBS’s argument implied that the per use fee would, like the
blanket license, solve the market failures of the atomistic market but
at less of a cost to CBS’s welfare. If CBS were correct, then the
restriction was not “reasonably necessary” (or ancillary) to the creation
of the product, and so would be properly subject to per se condemnation.
By failing to address this argument head-on, and rather focusing
on the market failure and the value of the new product, the Court
evaded the incommensurate tradeoff actually required by the case.
Direct assessment of CBS’s claim would involve trading off the higher
prices CBS was evidently paying for the blanket license than it would
for the hypothetical “per use” license, against the degree to which the
existence of “per use” licenses would erode (if at all) the value of BMI’s
product: spontaneous, indemnified use of an almost unlimited set of
songs. The Court’s decision implied that the financial cost to CBS was
not worth the threat to the quality of the new product, but in failing to
frame the decision this way, the Court avoided all discussion of
incommensurate balancing.
3. Self-Regulatory Restraints that Mitigate a Market Failure
Rule of reason cases often confront the welfare effects of
attempts at industry self-regulation, where balancing competitive
effects usually involves comparing incommensurate values. Many
common self-regulatory actions—such as limiting advertising,
standardizing a product across competitors, or restricting how services
can be priced—relax price competition among rivals and thus tend to
lead to higher consumer prices.114 Here, the negative effect on
consumers is rather straightforward, as it was in the resale price
maintenance example: all things being equal, higher prices reduce
consumer surplus. But of course not all things are equal, and firms
defend such restraints by claiming that they contribute to consumer
surplus by solving one or more market failures.115 Fixing poorly

114. See Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102, 1113 (2014) (demonstrating
how licensing boards can raise prices by “making entry [into the profession] difficult”).
115. Here, I use “market failure” in its broadest possible sense, sweeping in all situations in
which a free market lacking in any horizontal coordination fails to provide consumers with what
they really want at a price that satisfies both consumers and producers. Cf. BLAIR & KASERMAN,
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functioning markets, defendants claim, raises product or service quality
and better matches consumer with product.116
Four categories of market failures cover the majority of
arguments raised by defendants in defense of self-regulation. First,
information asymmetry, often found in markets for services, can lead to
a market failure that results in too-low quality products, leaving
consumers who demand—and are willing to pay for—high quality
services without any options. Second, a market plagued by
externalities—that is, when the true costs or benefits of a transaction
are visited on more than the parties to the transaction—can also result
in suboptimal quality products. Third, markets with high search and
transaction costs result in waste that harms both consumers and
producers. Fourth, in markets where product interaction and
connectivity is valued, unfettered competition can result in too much
product variety. Here standardization among competitors can help
increase consumer welfare. For any act of self-regulation aimed at
solving one or more of these market failures, a Rule of Reason analysis
requires trading off price increases for an incommensurate measure of
consumer welfare.
a. Information Asymmetry and Externalities
Some agreements challenged under § 1 are aimed at addressing
information asymmetries between consumers and producers.
Information asymmetry can lead to a market failure famously
illustrated by George A. Akerlof in his article The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.117 If a market contains
goods of mixed quality, but consumers are unable to ascertain quality
differences before purchase, then they will be unwilling to pay a
premium for what producers describe as high-quality goods.118 If even
honest sellers cannot attract a higher price for actually better products

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“[D]epartures from competitive outcomes are viewed as
“market failures” for which remedial actions may be necessary.”).
116. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust
Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 623 (1989) (“Defendants have also attempted to
introduce quality/harm evidence to demonstrate that their restrictive practices would promote
competition by improving the quality of care provided to consumers.”).
117. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
118. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 5–6 (1990).
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(often referred to as “peaches”),119 then sellers have no incentive to deal
in peaches, and will offer only minimum quality goods (Akerlof’s
“lemons”) at the low price that consumers are willing to pay for goods of
dubious quality. This means that the market for peaches cannot exist
at all, and only lemons will be sold.120 The unraveling of the peach
market is a market failure in the sense that consumers may prefer
peaches to lemons, and would be willing to pay a higher price for them,
but consumers’ lack of information makes such a transaction—wealthenhancing for sellers and buyers—impossible.121 Information
asymmetry is especially a problem in markets for professional services,
where quality is difficult to ascertain before (and sometimes even after)
purchasing a service.
Professional service markets can also exhibit failures associated
with externalities. Market externalities occur when the full costs or
benefits of a product are not borne by the parties to the transaction.122
In a market with externalities, rivalrous competition can actually erode
the quality of the product rather than enhance it. For example, when
the costs of poor medical care are borne not only by the patient but also
by his employer, the local ER, an insurance company, or the
government, a patient may be willing to purchase too-low quality
care.123 Externalization of costs could lead to more low-price, lowquality transactions than are optimal for society, or than would happen
in a market where the parties to the transaction internalized all their
costs.124
Thus professional restrictions often aim to increase product
quality and combat the market failures caused by externalities and
information asymmetry. The fact that the consumer then pays more for
the service does not indicate that his welfare is reduced because, in
theory, he is getting more for the higher price. But whereas the increase
in cost of professional service is relatively demonstrable and
quantifiable, claims of improved quality from removing market failures
are often theoretical or subjective, and of course, different in kind. In
these cases, courts must trade off the incommensurate values of quality
and price.

119. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1609–10 (2011)(“[I]f buyers do not know whether
they are getting a lemon or a peach, they will not pay a peach price.”).
120. Akerlof, supra note 117, at 498.
121. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115–16, 1147–48.
122. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 115, at 375.
123. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115.
124. Id. at 1102.
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Further, because professional self-regulation can raise price and
quality, it tends to harm consumers who are less sensitive to quality
but prefer a low price and to benefit consumers with large budgets
demanding high-quality service. Evaluating professional selfregulation will often require courts to weigh harm to one class of
consumer against harm to another class, leading to the apples-tooranges problem associated with interpersonal comparisons of welfare.
The Supreme Court confronted these tradeoffs between free and
(arguably) more functional competition in National Society of
Professional Engineers.125 The case challenged a professional rule of
ethics created and enforced by the National Society of Professional
Engineers, a membership organization that counted the majority of
licensed engineers among its members. The rule banned competitive
bidding, defined as the submission of “estimates of cost or proposals in
terms of dollars . . . or any other measure of compensation whereby the
prospective client may compare engineering services on a price
basis.”126
The restriction had the obvious potential to raise prices of
engineering services, but the engineers argued against per se
condemnation of the practice by claiming it had the procompetitive
effect of raising the quality of engineering services. Specifically, the
engineers argued:
Experience has . . . demonstrated that competitive bidding . . . results in an award of the
work to be performed to the lowest bidder, regardless of other factors such as ability [and]
experience . . . and that such awards in the case of professional engineers endanger the
public health, welfare and safety.127

Although the engineers did not spell out their argument in terms of
market failures, it is clear that the harm they associated with price
bidding depended on the presence of information asymmetries and
externalities in the market. Essentially the engineers argued that price
competition incentivized low-price, low-quality bidding, which
consumers purchased either because they could not tell that the work
offered was low quality (information asymmetry), or because some of
the cost of dangerous buildings and bridges would be visited on third
parties (externalities).128 The engineers argued that by disincentivizing
low-cost bids, their rule fixed these market failures.

125. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978).
126. Id. at 683 n.3.
127. Id. at 685 n.7.
128. See Brief for Petitioner at 54–55, Nat’l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (No. 761767), 1977 WL 189266, at *54–55 (discussing not only the direct design costs, but also the lifetime
costs, maintenance costs, and the potential cost of collapse or other public disaster).
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The Court was asked to trade off the incommensurate values of
price (which was very likely to be higher under the rule) with improved
engineering quality. And because the rule had a blanket application—
almost all engineers belonged to the society and were required to adhere
to its rules—consumers were not in a position to make the
incommensurate tradeoff themselves.
Faced with the prospect of choosing between quality and price,
or between rivalry or self-regulation, the Court dodged. It ostensibly
rejected the proffered procompetitive justification altogether as
“nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act,”129 seeming to obviate any incommensurate balancing. But at the
same time, it is clear from the opinion that the Court at least
entertained the potential gains to quality that consumers may have
enjoyed from the restriction, because the opinion did not condemn the
restriction as per se illegal.130 The Court’s declaration that the Sherman
Act’s “policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition
is good or bad”131 is at odds not only with its refusal to apply the per se
rule in that case, but with many Rule of Reason cases that accept
procompetitive justifications that cure market failures associated with
unfettered rivalry among competitors.
California Dental v. FTC,132 in which the Court seemed
comfortable sacrificing rivalry for a better functioning market, is just
such a case. The dental association, counting the majority of California
dentists among its members,133 prohibited false or misleading
advertising, which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found involved
a de facto ban on advertising price or service quality. The FTC
presented evidence that in other industries, similar advertising bans
were associated with higher consumer prices. The dentists invoked
Akerloff’s “lemons problem” to justify the restriction, arguing that
unfettered competition in dental advertising would worsen the
information asymmetry problem in the market for dental services.
Unlike in Engineers, where the Court seemed to categorically reject any

129. Nat’l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
130. Within the same paragraph, the Court explained its intention to “adhere to the view
expressed in Goldfarb that, by their nature, professional services may differ significantly from
other business services, and, accordingly . . . [e]thical norms may serve to regulate and promote . . .
competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 696.
131. Id. at 690 n.14; see also id. at 692 (“[T]he purpose of the [rule of reason] analysis is to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry.”).
132. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
133. Id. at 759.
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argument that competition is bad for consumers, the Court in Cal
Dental found the quality arguments advanced by the dentists to be
plausible enough to save the restriction from summary
condemnation.134
The dentists’ argument about advertising and the lemons
problem is somewhat counter-intuitive, and so requires some
explanation. Truthful advertising can help solve the information
asymmetry problem, since it can provide a vehicle for communicating
product quality to the consumer. If the consumers can sort the lemons
from the peaches, perhaps because they have been well-described in
advertisements, then the market will function properly, allowing the
high-quality sellers to charge a premium for their products and the lowquality producers to sell to the buyers with low ability or willingness to
pay. Restricting truthful advertising can exacerbate the information
asymmetry between consumers and producers, and can contribute to
the lemons problem.135
But not all advertising is truthful, and especially in the market
for professional services, claims about quality are difficult to verify. In
a world where producers can be expected to over-claim without serious
consequences, advertising can make the information asymmetry
problem worse. For example, when a patient willing to pay for
“painless” dental services finds those services to be very painful indeed,
he feels he actually knows less about the service than he did before
seeing the advertisement, and he is less willing to pay for dental
services in the future. High-quality, high-cost dentists cannot attract
customers in such an atmosphere of distrust, and so all dentists find
themselves in Akerlof’s market for lemons.136 Thus, restrictions on false
advertising can combat information asymmetry and mitigate market
failure. But in practice, advertising restrictions can never perfectly sort
the truthful from the false advertising; rules will inevitably chill some
truthful advertising while also reducing puffery and fraud.
By remanding the case for more thorough consideration, the
Court essentially asked the lower court to trade off quality and price,137

134. Id. at 778 (arguing the restrictions may simply be a procompetitive ban on false or
misleading statements).
135. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115 n.101 (discussing a similar line of reasoning
with respect to occupational licensing requirements).
136. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 774–75 (“[T]he recurrence of some measure of intentional or
accidental misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might leak out over time to make
potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-board advertising, so undercutting the method’s
effectiveness.” (citing Akerlof, supra note 117, at 495)).
137. Id. (explaining that the lower court should weigh the procompetitive benefits of quality
advertising against the potential for anticompetitive price increases).
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implying that, contrary to its proclamations in Engineers, § 1 liability
sometimes requires courts to trade off free, but failing markets for
fettered, yet functional ones. In the end, the different outcomes in
Engineers and Cal Dental are easily justified; the price increase likely
to flow from a ban on competitive price bidding is probably larger than
the higher prices associated with advertising restrictions. And the
presence of governmental regulation in the Engineers case (state
licensing for engineers and state and local building codes) meant that
problems associated with information asymmetry and externalities
may have already been addressed by a less self-interested actor.
But the Court’s pronouncement in Engineers that the
association’s defense—that unfettered rivalry was bad for the market—
was a “frontal assault on the policy of the Sherman Act”138 makes no
sense,139 except as an effort to appear to avoid the inevitable
incommensurate balancing that cases like Engineers and Cal Dental
demand. In fact, incommensurate balancing occurred in both cases: in
Engineers when the Court decided a ban on price bidding was just too
anticompetitive to outweigh the possible quality benefits, and in Cal
Dental when the lower court on remand conducted a more thorough
inquiry into the restriction’s effect on price and quality.140
b. Search and Transaction Costs
Firms frequently restrict competition among themselves with an
eye toward making the market more accessible to consumers. These
restrictions are aimed at preventing or mitigating market failures
associated with high search and transaction costs. Evaluating the
competitive effects of efforts to solve these problems requires balancing
incommensurate values.
If the costs of seeking out a product, comparing it with the others
on the market, and completing a transaction are borne by the consumer,
then his willingness to pay for the product will be diminished by the
costs he must incur in purchasing it. When those costs are high, it can
discourage a significant number of mutually wealth-enhancing

138. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
139. Scholars have noted that Engineers should not be taken seriously in its language that
seems to prohibit such considerations under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The
New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 862 (1989) (suggesting that Engineers should not be
taken “too literally in rejecting the safety justification offered”). Similarly, Phillip Areeda
admonished: “I doubt that the Court meant to go so far as to condemn a restraint that actually
saves lives.” PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (1987).
140. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 950–57 (9th Cir. 2000) (ultimately holding
that the procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects).
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transactions that would be consummated if search and transaction
costs were low or non-existent. These deterred exchanges represent a
deadweight loss to society—the consumer and the producer fail to
realize their joint surplus because it was overwhelmed by the costs of
finding and entering into the transaction. This kind of market failure
will not typically unravel the market, as in the case of information
asymmetry, but it is an example of the market failing to match buyer
and seller at an otherwise mutually acceptable price.
Producers have an incentive to address market failures caused
by search and transaction costs because those costs reduce consumer
demand for their products. By reducing the consumers’ costs in finding
and engaging in the transactions, producers can increase demand,
allowing for higher profits on each transaction and allowing
transactions that would not otherwise have occurred. And often the
producers are in a good position to reduce search and transaction costs,
for example by creating a single marketplace for the product or a central
repository for information that facilitates comparison shopping. Of
course organizing a marketplace or standardizing a product listing
service requires collective action and often involves creating rules for
inclusion and exclusion of competitors. When competitors use these
opportunities to self-deal, their restrictions can raise price or restrict
output.
For example, realtors often combine their efforts to create a
multiple listing service (MLS) that provides up-to-date, centralized, and
uniform information about houses for sale.141 Allowing such one-stop
shopping benefits consumers by allowing them to quickly comparison
shop and saves them time and effort in finding the right house.142 For
at least one class of consumers—those who highly value convenience,
lack the means to research homes for sale, or place a premium on their

141. Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247, 2293 (2007)
(“Real estate agents often combine through realtor associations to create a multiple listing service
(MLS), in which all of the available properties in a particular geographic area are listed in a
centralized registry.”); see, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
142. Robert W. Hahn, Robert E. Litan & Jesse Gurman, Bringing More Competition To Real
Estate Brokerage, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 86, 95–96 (2006) (“Collecting all of the listings for a given
region in one place significantly reduces the amount of time buyers and sellers—and their
brokers—have to spend gathering information that is crucial to potential transactions.”); Mark S.
Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to Maximum
Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183, 186 (2000) (“Databases, like the real
estate industry’s multiple-listing services (“MLSs”), offer consumers access to a dramatically
broader set of options than any traditional store or salesperson's memory could hold. They also
permit shoppers to sort these options according to dozens, if not hundreds, of attributes.”).
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leisure time—the MLS can significantly improve their purchasing
experience.
But the standardization required to create an MLS means
competitor realtors must agree on how much and what kind of
information will be offered to consumers, which can restrict the terms
of competition in the housing market. Further, competitors must
control access to the list to incentivize realtor participation. Unfettered
access to the list may permit free riding by realtors who wish to use the
valuable resource without contributing their own information to it.
Thus, many multiple listing services require realtors to share their own
information as an “ante” to using the list at all.143 Finally, realtors may
want to preserve the value of their list as accurate and honest by
restricting membership only to those realtors in good standing. Each of
these acts of restriction and exclusion has the potential to decrease price
competition.144 Evaluating MLS services under the Rule of Reason thus
requires balancing consumer values that trade in different units of
measure.
In Realcomp II, LTD. v. FTC,145 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
FTC’s decision condemning a multiple listing service’s exclusion of
homes listed by low-cost agents offering less than the full package of
traditional broker services. The defendants claimed that the low-cost
providers were free riders, and that exclusion of free riders was
necessary to the very existence of the list.146 The opinion weighed the
harm to the competitive process—excluding low-cost competitors—
against the arguments offered that the restriction promoted the
competitive process by excluding free riders.147 The court had an easy
time of it, since, as it turns out, this particular free-rider argument
made no sense; the low-cost providers contributed (albeit indirectly) to
the listing service in the same way all members did.148 But a legitimate
free-rider argument would have put the court in the position of having
to trade off apples and oranges.
Another category of horizontal restraints on trade aimed at
combatting transaction and search costs are rules establishing

143. Cf. Leslie, supra note 141, at 2293 (presenting the analogy between MLS and traditional
tying services, suggesting that undesired but required membership is tied to desired access).
144. See, e.g., Hahn, Litan & Gurman, supra note 142, at 96 (discussing the potential for
anticompetitive practices through MLS, including controlling access to the services in an effort to
discourage brokers from charging lower fees).
145. 635 F.3d 815 (2011).
146. See id. at 835.
147. Id. at 829–36.
148. Id. at 834 (rejecting the procompetitive justification of excluding free-riders as “not
legitimate, plausible, substantial, and reasonable”).
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marketplaces and exchanges. Marketplaces and exchanges create
centralized locations and standardized systems for consummating
transactions and can thereby reduce costs on both sides of the market,
much like multiple listing services. They also afford competitors an
opportunity to relax price competition by setting the who, what, where,
and when of exchange. Assessing the competitive effect of competitorcreated marketplaces requires trading off incommensurate notions of
consumer welfare: price and convenience.
A good illustration of the commensurability problem raised by
competitor-controlled marketplaces is the case that established the
most famous formulation of the Rule of Reason, 1918’s Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States.149 The Board of Trade, run by competitor
purchasers of grain, was the largest grain market in the world. Trade
occurred both during the open hours of the market—from 9:30 to 1:15—
and after the market closed. But whereas the official market hours were
open to both members and to the public, only members could trade after
hours.150 The market was bifurcated into a thicker market during the
day, and a thin market after the exchange closed, where presumably
the few member purchasers were able to exert market power to
artificially bid down the price of grain.151 The restriction challenged in
the case was designed to combat the problem of monopsony in this afterhours market by fixing the after-hours price at the last price traded at
in the regular hours market.152 The restriction was challenged under §
1 as illegal price fixing.153
Did the restriction in Board of Trade of Chicago promote or
hinder competition? It did both, but in different ways. It increased
competition in the daytime market by promoting two conditions
associated with competitive markets: numerous buyers and sellers.
Prior to the rule, member purchasers had an incentive not to bid during
the day, when they had to compete with the general public, and instead
wait until the market closed, when they could exert their monopsony
power to their advantage.154 And since members could purchase on

149. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
150. Id. at 236 (describing the public, “regular session” compared to the private, “special
sessions”).
151. Cf. Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions,
Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 n.111 (2010).
152. Bd. of Trade of Chi. at 237 (explaining the “call rule”—the restriction challenged in the
case—which fixed the price of transactions between the close of the session and the opening the
next day at the last trading price at the close of the public market).
153. Id. at 238.
154. Cf. Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor
Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 775, 797 (2012).
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behalf of others after the market closed, even the general public would
prefer not to participate in the daytime market if it could get a member
to bid on its behalf in the evenings. By hobbling this purchaser cartel,
the restriction made the daytime market more attractive to all market
participants and so increased the volume of trading,155 likely driving
price down.
But the restriction also suppressed all price competition in the
after-hours market. And, together with all the rules that created the
grain market in Chicago—from opening hours to membership policy—
it tinkered with the free-market process by allowing competitors to set
potentially self-dealing limits on who could make deals and when.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the rule’s benefits to
competition in the official grain market justified restricting competition
in the after-hours market, and approved the restriction under what
would become known as the Rule of Reason. That decision was perfectly
sensible, but it implied a value judgment about which market, and
which kind of competition—free but failing competition or fettered but
functional competition—was more valuable under the circumstances.
c. Product Standardization
A final category of restraints vulnerable under § 1 are those
aimed at reducing product differentiation. Where product
interconnectivity is valued, or where simultaneous use of products is
desirable, atomistic competition can lead to more product variety than
consumers demand. In these markets it is common for competitors to
combine their efforts to develop a standard with which all producers
will comply.156
Standardization offers obvious benefits to consumer welfare by
increasing the usefulness of products (an element of product quality).
And it can stimulate product innovation by making interface and
interaction possible, leading to more complex and sophisticated
technology that consumers want. But the ways in which standards
threaten consumer welfare are significant and typically
incommensurate with the benefits. First, standardization can reduce
consumer welfare by eliminating incompatible features that some
consumers want. Second, and relatedly, standardization harms
consumers by reducing variety and choice. And third, because the

155. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 240 (observing that the rule “brought into the regular
market hours of the Board sessions, more of the trading in grain ‘to arrive’ ”).
156. Standard-setting is facilitated by the Standard Setting Organization Advancement Act.
See 14 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012).
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standard setting process gives competitors an opportunity to exclude
firms that are poorly positioned to comply with the standard,
standardization can reduce the number of competitors and lead to
higher prices and restricted output. Courts considering a § 1 challenge
to an agreement on a standard must trade off these incommensurate
values in measuring competitive effect.
Such tradeoffs are ubiquitous in high-tech industries,157 but the
phenomenon of standardization stimulating demand is also observable
in other kinds of markets. In Continental Airlines, Inc., v. United
Airlines, Inc.,158 competing airlines at Dulles airport coordinated
around a single overhead luggage size limit so that the security stations
at the airport, which serviced all airlines, could use a single template to
measure luggage as it passed through x-ray machines. Absent
coordination, security officers would have to ask individual passengers
which airline they were flying and switch templates, leading to delays
and frustration.159 The preferred experience for consumers was a
streamlined, quick trip through security, which required coordination
among competing airlines as to the size and shape of the baggage
template.
The size agreed on by the majority of the airlines operating at
Dulles was smaller, however, than that preferred by Continental
Airlines. Continental had invested in planes with large overhead
capacity and was marketing to its customers the convenience of
traveling without having to check baggage.160 Continental sued,
arguing that the standard unfairly restricted its ability to compete on
overhead space.161 Although the district court summarily condemned
the restraint after a “quick look” (an abbreviated form of the Rule of
Reason),162 the Fourth Circuit reversed, essentially arguing that the

157. For example, standard-setting is ubiquitous in the wireless communication industry. If
manufacturers of wireless-enabled devices competed without coordination, then each firm would
produce devices compatible with only a particular kind of wireless signal. The demand for wireless
products would obviously be less in such a market than in a market where the device
manufacturers, and perhaps the developers of wireless signals, had coordinated around one
compatible system, allowing all consumers to use their wireless products everywhere. See Apple,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911–12 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
158. 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
159. Id. at 512 (noting that this was particularly troublesome at Dulles Airport, which had
only two security checkpoints and therefore caused several “bottlenecks”).
160. Id. at 505.
161. Id. at 507.
162. The “quick look,” first established by the court in the 1970s, is a truncated version of the
Rule of Reason that is something less than a full market analysis. Some have likened the §1
liability to a spectrum, with per se on one end, full-blown Rule of Reason on the other, and quick
look in the middle.
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district court had failed to consider the market failure that would occur
without standardization of baggage size.163
Like so many opinions that confront commensurability
problems, the Fourth Circuit’s decision did not detail the different and
incommensurate competitive effects of the restriction. But it is clear
from the facts of the case that any Rule of Reason analysis (including a
“quick look”) would have to balance the convenience offered by the
standard template against the additional benefit Continental
passengers would receive from having more overhead luggage space.
This comparison would involve not only trading off two
incommensurate aspects of the quality of the flying experience (speed
of security versus luggage convenience), but it would also involve
trading off the harm to one class of consumers (Continental passengers)
against benefits to another (passengers of other airlines). And the Rule
of Reason would also have to account for the ways in which such
standard setting would suppress innovation in airline travel, such as
Continental’s development of more overhead luggage space for its
passengers. The court rightly remanded for a more detailed analysis of
these tradeoffs,164 but it did not note, as courts seldom do, that the
tradeoff would involve incommensurate comparisons.
III. THE DANGER OF THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH:
DOCTRINES OF AVOIDANCE
Since the commensurability myth has made overt value
judgments—for example between quality and price, between consumer
value now and later, and between different classes of consumers—
appear illegitimate, it should not be surprising that courts have
embraced doctrinal elements of the law that help them avoid, or at least
appear to avoid, incommensurate balancing. Some avoidance moves
could, at least in theory, truly obviate the incommensurability problem,
and these should be used when appropriate. But too often these
doctrines of avoidance do not really avoid the commensurability
problem at all, but merely relegate it to the subtext of a decision, leaving
the value judgments untheorized and undefended.
The full list of avoidance moves is long. It includes procedural
decisions such as lower courts punting Rule of Reason decisions to a

163. Cont’l Airlines, 277 F.3d at 513 (suggesting that the standard templates would promote
a service not otherwise available at this particular airport). The court even seemed to say that it
believed consumers preferred streamlined security procedures to larger overhead luggage
capacity, and for that reason the restriction was procompetitive. See id. at 514.
164. Id. at 516–17.
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jury, appellate courts remanding for further consideration, and the
Supreme Court denying certiorari. It also includes Daubert decisions to
exclude expert testimony essential to a pro- or anticompetitive
argument. It also includes the aggressive use of increasingly stringent
requirements on pleading. And it also includes the use of a “least
restrictive alternative” analysis, which courts use to condemn
restrictions whose effect could be achieved through a less
anticompetitive means.165
Here I focus on three categories of avoidance techniques that are
somewhat specific to antitrust, and that have at least some doctrinal
pedigree. First, courts often use “burden shifting” in § 1 cases to avoid
side-by-side comparison of pro- and anticompetitive arguments, rather
than as a tool to weed out unmeritorious cases. Second, and somewhat
relatedly, courts often find the presence of any plausible procompetitive
argument to allow a restriction to pass muster under the Rule of
Reason, thus creating a kind of per se legality that avoids overt
balancing. Third, courts often place unreasonable demands on
plaintiffs—in the form of empirical evidence and unassailable market
definitions—in order to avoid considering the defendant’s
procompetitive (and usually incommensurate) argument at all.
A. The Burden-Shifting Paradigm and Avoiding the
Appearance of Judgment
Although early formulations of the Rule of Reason seemed to call
for a direct balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects, unstructured
balancing quickly came under heavy attack as an unworkable and
unwieldy standard.166 Most criticisms of unstructured balancing focus
on difficulties in measuring effects,167 but the incommensurability of
pro- and anticompetitive effects are likewise a reason to disfavor openended balancing. In the 1980s, coinciding with the reorientation of
antitrust around an economic standard, courts (with the help of
scholars) developed a solution: impose a series of burden-shifts on
165. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, The Less Restrictive Alternatives Shortcut (Nov. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668269 [http://perma.cc/WPR8-VAXC]
(describing variations on the Least Restrictive Alternatives test and noting their effects on
litigation).
166. See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 389 (3d ed., 2006).
167. See, e.g., id. at 397 (observing that there is almost never enough information about a
competitive restraint to “quantify the magnitude” of its effect); COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION ON THE MERITS 11 (2005),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RFH-TUA7?type=source]
(discussing challenges of evaluating the magnitude of changes in net consumer welfare, even
assuming it were possible to determine whether they were net pro- or anti-competitive).
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parties to a § 1 suit, reserving balancing for worst-case scenarios where
both sides carry their burdens.
In theory, burden-shifting could help judges with the
commensurability problem presented by the Rule of Reason. It could be
used to force parties and judges to identify the precise harms and
benefits on either side, and if neither side had a logical argument about
helping or harming competition, it could speed resolution of the case.
But instead, empirical research has shown that the burden almost
never shifts even in the first instance, suggesting something is amiss
with the “burden-shifting” framework itself. The commensurability
myth at the heart of § 1 is at least partly to blame.
1. The Rise of the Burden-Shifting Paradigm
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chicago Board of Trade is often
cited for its formulation of the Rule of Reason. The Court explained that
for those restraints not subject to the per se rule, courts should engage
in an all-things-considered inquiry into the reasonableness of the
restraint. The opinion suggested courts should consider:
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.168

Although Chicago Board of Trade seemed to make relevant all facts
particular to the business and all kinds of evil that the restraint is
designed to address, today only arguments about economic or
competitive effect are accepted on both sides of the scale.169
Even this modification left the rule without enough structure for
fair and predictable application because the economics of a restraint
could be complex and were almost always contested. In response to this
problem, courts and academics began to spell out a “structured Rule of
Reason” that offered to avoid the “wilds of economic theory.”170 Today,
numerous versions of this structured Rule of Reason abound,171 but they
all share a similar structure: they impose a series of burden shifts on
168. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
169. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 389; cf. supra note 12 and sources cited
therein.
170. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 622 (1972).
171. Formulations of the burden-shifting paradigm include “quick look” review, see Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999); “inherently suspect” analysis, see Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); and the “truncated Rule of Reason”
(California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). Each differs slightly,
but their basic structure—shifting burdens between plaintiff and defendant to show anti- and
procompetitive effects—is the same.
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the litigating parties in an effort to avoid head-to-head comparison of
pro- and anticompetitive effects in all but the closest cases. Although
originally associated with “quick look” review, most courts and critics
agree that all levels of Rule of Reason scrutiny, from “quick look” to
“full-blown” market analysis, call for structured burden-shifting.172
Essentially, to carry its initial burden, the plaintiff must first
show a plausible anticompetitive effect of the restraint.173 Then the
burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate procompetitive
argument in favor of the restraint.174 The plaintiff then has an
opportunity either to rebut the defendant’s justification or to argue that
the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the claimed
procompetitive effect—sometimes this is called the “least restrictive
alternative” test.175 Only when the plaintiff and defendant have both
met their burdens must the court “balance” the pro- and
anticompetitive effects.176 That burden-shifting could reduce reliance—
or at least the appearance of reliance—on balancing incommensurate
values made the framework especially appealing to those judges who
saw their role in antitrust litigation as staying out of value-laden
judgments.
2. Burden-Shifting Comes Up Short
Although it is popular to write opinions according to the burdenshifting paradigm—so much so that one scholar has commented that
“rule of reason balancing is perhaps the greatest myth in all of U.S.
antitrust law”177—closer observation reveals that burden-shifting is
doing less work than its proponents claim. In his impressively
comprehensive empirical study of all 495 rule of reason cases decided
between 1977 and 1999, Professor Michael Carrier set out to prove that
“balancing,” although nominally the primary mode of rule of reason
analysis, almost never happened.178 And so he did: in only 4% of cases

172. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule
of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 760 (2012) (describing burden-shifting); Muris, supra
note 139.
173. Gavil, supra note 172, at 760.
174. Id.
175. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of
Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 583 (2009).
176. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 390.
177. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 207 (2d ed. 2008).
178. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 16 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1267 (1999).
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did the court ever actually reach the balancing phase.179 The rest were
disposed of at an earlier inflection point. But in the process he found
something else: that burden-shifting itself was extremely rare. His
study found that in 84% of cases the plaintiff did not carry its initial
burden and thus the burden never shifted to the defendant.180 When he
updated the study a decade later, his results were even starker. Ninetyseven percent of rule of reason cases decided between 1999 and 2009
never progressed beyond the plaintiff’s prima facie case.181 Of the 3%
that did survive the initial shift, two-thirds ended in head-to-head
balancing.182
This paucity of actual burden shifts could mean that the burdenshifting paradigm has lent much-needed structure to § 1 analysis, and
revealed that the overwhelming majority of antitrust plaintiffs have no
plausible anticompetitive argument when they walk through the
courthouse door.183 This may be part of the explanation, but there is
also reason to believe that the commensurability myth has put pressure
on judges to dismiss cases quickly, before fully considering the
competitive arguments on both sides. Writing opinions in a manner that
suggests the burden never shifted at all has advantages in an
environment where incommensurate balancing is seen as illegitimate.
We may therefore expect judges to seek out rules and doctrines
that make it especially difficult for the plaintiff to carry its initial
burden. A close reading of the cases bears out this prediction. Early
formulations of the structured rule of reason suggested that the
plaintiff’s prima facie burden was light: a plaintiff must show only that
there is a significant anticompetitive effect, theoretical or empirical,
associated with the defendant’s restriction.184 But when courts began to
consider the details of what was required to make this showing, the rule
became progressively less liberal. The requirement of “actual effects”

179. Id. at 1269.
180. Id. at 1268.
181. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule Of Reason: An Empirical Update For The 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009).
182. Id. at 827. This research bears out Professor Gavil’s observation about the “myth” of
balancing, but it also bears out the observation that the Rule of Reason is merely a euphemism for
“defendant wins”: between 1977 and 2009, defendants won in 98% of the cases.
183. This is certainly a popular view of the burden-shifting paradigm. See Feldman, supra
note 175, at 576 (interpreting Professor Carrier’s results as showing that courts rarely perform
balancing because one side has failed to show competitive effect and citing sources coming to
similar conclusions).
184. Philip Areeda, The Rule Of Reason—A Catechism On Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
571, 582 (1986) (suggesting that a plaintiff need only show that the defendant engaged in activity
that can restrain trade significantly, or which can result in impairment of consumer welfare which
is likely to be significant).

2016]

THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH

49

evidence, discussed below, is an example.185 Another technique to make
the burden shift harder is to perform unacknowledged balancing at the
initial stage, effectively asking the plaintiff to put on more than a prima
facie case. Opinions accepting or rejecting a plaintiff’s initial case are
frequently infused with analysis of the defendant’s justification, and so
implicitly perform the very balancing burden-shifting is meant to avoid.
For example, when a plaintiff challenges a restriction that
arguably solves a market failure, courts will analyze the market failure
when considering whether the plaintiff has made an initial showing of
competitive harm.186 California Dental is an obvious example: there the
Court explained that because the market for dental services could suffer
from market failures caused by information asymmetries, and because
the dental association claimed that the restrictions were tailored to
prevent misinformation, the FTC had failed to raise a sufficient
anticompetitive effect in the first place.187 But because an argument
about solving a market failure goes to the procompetitive potential of
the restraint, it should have been dealt with at the second shift when
the defendant must show procompetitive effects.188
Lower court case law provides several additional illustrations of
implicit balancing at the initial burden stage. In Barry v. Blue Cross of
California,189 the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to vertical
arrangements between Blue Cross and participating physicians,
including an agreement not to refer Blue Cross patients to non-Blue
Cross physicians without patient consent. After extensively analyzing
and crediting Blue Cross’s procompetitive arguments, the Court
185. See infra Section III.C.
186. See e.g., Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 1986); Nat’l Cable
Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 625–26 (D.D.C. 1991); cf. Monsanto
Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 580–81 (N.D. Miss. 2004) aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (though Monsanto was nominally the plaintiff in this suit, the defendant farmers
raised Monsanto’s alleged antitrust law violation as a defense and thus had the burden of initially
showing competitive harm).
187. The Court held that the Rule of Reason requires courts to “identif[y] the theoretical basis
for the anticompetitive effects and consider[ ] whether the effects actually are anticompetitive”
before the burden shifts to the defendant. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999)
(emphasis added).
188. This defect may be inherent in burden-shifting in the first place. Even courts intending
to follow the burden-shifting paradigm closely may find themselves discussing market failure in
considering the plaintiff’s initial burden because the question cannot be parsed so cleanly. After
all, a strict burden-shifting regime would have courts asking a rather pointless question: whether
in a market without any market failures (which is not, according to the defendants at least, this
market) the restriction would be anticompetitive. Of course a restriction that successfully
confronts a market failure at minimal cost to competition serves antitrust’s goals, and so it is
awkward for courts to claim, even as a prima facie matter, that there is an anticompetitive
potential to the restraint.
189. 805 F.2d at 867–68.
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concluded that “[t]herefore, the agreements do not have any prohibited
anticompetitive effects,”190 and so did not shift the burden. The
Northern District of Mississippi was even more brief in its treatment of
anticompetitive arguments in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,191 in which it
held the Scruggses192 to an initial burden of proving “an unreasonable
restraint of trade,”193 conflating the ultimate balancing standard with
the initial burden. It found, in one sentence, that the burden had not
been met.194
Similarly, in a case challenging the same blanket license
agreement at issue in BMI, the District Court for the District of
Columbia implicitly considered procompetitive effects when evaluating
the plaintiff’s claim of anticompetitive effects.195 The court found that
the plaintiff had had not alleged that a restraint existed at all, because
licensees were still free to individually negotiate with artists.196 To
claim that the blanket license involves no restraint at all is to ignore
that the license is a product of a horizontal agreement among thousands
of songwriters to offer a specific product under specific terms. The fact
that parties were still free to individually negotiate mitigated the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint, and so should have been
considered only after the initial burden shift.
The conflation of pro- and anticompetitive effects at the initial
stage undermines the “structure” claimed for burden-shifting and
requires the balancing of incommensurate values in an implicit—and
thus opaque—manner. It is too facile, therefore, to read Professor
Carrier’s research as proof that “balancing” very rarely happens in § 1
cases or that burden-shifting has obviated the need for value judgments
in all but 2% of Rule of Reason cases. That judgment is often happening
without the court acknowledging the need for any balancing at all.

190. Id. at 872.
191. 342 F. Supp. 2d 568.
192. Typically the plaintiff bears the initial burden to show anticompetitive effects, but in
Scruggs the roles were reversed because it was the defendant that raised the Sherman Act §1
claim as a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit.
193. Id. at 580.
194. Id.
195. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 625–26 (D.D.C.
1991).
196. Id.
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B. Ancillarity and Per Se Legality
Relatedly, judges sometimes use the very presence of
procompetitive justifications as a complete defense in Rule of Reason
cases. While this move ostensibly avoids head-to-head balancing, it does
not avoid the commensurability problem; any judgment that a
procompetitive effect legitimates an anticompetitive practice per se
implies that the procompetitive value—which likely is different in kind
from the anticompetitive effect alleged—is always more important.
That judgment implies a choice between competing incommensurate
competitive values, but is almost never accompanied by a discussion or
defense of that choice.
The idea that procompetitive potential always trumps
anticompetitive effect has old roots that can be traced to a decision that
predates the Rule of Reason itself. That case, United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co.,197 is often credited with ancillarity analysis,198 which
in modern doctrine can save a restriction from per se illegality in favor
of Rule of Reason analysis. But often a finding of ancillarity is
tantamount to per se legality, and Professor Bork has argued that this
is rightly so,199 perhaps because it avoids incommensurate balancing.
This move, however, implies a value judgment between
incommensurate measures of competition and welfare, albeit in a tacit,
unexamined way.
Judge Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Addyston Pipe,
explained that the test of legality under the Sherman Act for
agreements restraining trade was whether they were “merely ancillary
to the main purpose of a lawful contract.”200 He justified this rule as
avoiding the indeterminacies of estimating “how much restraint of
competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.”201
Essentially, Judge Taft argued that ancillarity analysis avoided direct
balancing of often incommensurate measures of pro- and
anticompetitive effects, an exercise he characterized as “set[ting] sail
on a sea of doubt.”202 Although the ancillarity defense endorsed by
Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe did not prevail as the dominant mode of §

197. 85 F. 271, 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
198. See Werden, supra note 1, at 753 (“[Taft’s] nascent ancillary restraints doctrine divided
all trade restraint into just two categories—ancillary and prohibited.”).
199. Professor Bork advocated per se legality for horizontal restraints and boycotts ancillary
to an otherwise procompetitive venture. See BORK, supra note 13 at 263–79 (horizontal restraints);
id. at 330–44 (boycotts).
200. 85 F. at 282.
201. Id. at 284.
202. Id.
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1 analysis, it was resurrected by courts during the economic
reorientation of antitrust in the 1970s and 80s as a way to avoid per se
condemnation and to earn the more lenient Rule of Reason analysis.
But at least in the case of vertical restraints, a finding of
ancillarity—that the restraint on intrabrand competition is ancillary to
a purpose to promote interbrand competition—is often enough to
declare the restraint lawful per se. Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, writing
fourteen years after non-price vertical restraints as a class were spared
per se condemnation and made subject to the Rule of Reason, studied
the analysis of the forty-one vertical cases decided in that interval.203
He found that almost half were resolved in favor of the defendant
without any consideration of intrabrand competitive effects, and thus
without any balancing. In these nineteen cases, the courts decided the
issue based entirely on the possibility of benefit—or at least lack of
harm—to interbrand competition.204 Similar observations have been
made about the treatment of vertical price agreements since 2007, when
Leegin spared them from per se condemnation.205
These cases imply that benefits to interbrand competition, no
matter how small, always trump costs to intrabrand competition, no
matter how large. That itself is a judgment between incommensurate
measures of consumer welfare. Rather than discuss the virtues and
vices of such a presumption, courts use Taft’s ancillarity framework to
appear to avoid choosing at all. This avoidance move allows important
and contested value judgments to fly under the radar, and allows courts
to appear to avoid the commensurability problem while actually
resolving it with a thumb on the scale in favor of legality.
C. Inconsistent Demands of “Actual” Evidence
Another popular technique used by courts to avoid appearing to
balance incommensurate values is to demand empirical evidence of
anticompetitive harm. In fact, it is far from clear that § 1 liability
actually requires empirical proof of competitive harm through higher
prices, decreased output, or even empirically-supported market power.
But several Supreme Court cases have left sufficient doubt on the
question that many lower courts feel free to demand what the Court has
203. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 73–75 (1991).
204. Id.
205. These cases have essentially adopted Professor Bork’s prescription, relying on Taft’s
ancillarity framework, that vertical restraints be subject to near per se legality. See D. Daniel
Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se
Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1003–04 (2014).
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confusingly called “actual evidence” from plaintiffs and dismiss their §
1 claims when they do not have it. Summary dismissal is attractive
because courts can then avoid balancing and thus the appearance of
judgment between incommensurate values.
It is relatively uncontroversial that a full-blown Rule of Reason
analysis requires some form of empirical evidence of competitive
harm.206 Such evidence can come in two forms. A plaintiff can show
harm indirectly by proving (empirically) market power and allowing the
court to infer competitive harm from the restriction.207 Alternatively,
the plaintiff can show empirical evidence of competitive harm—
typically through higher prices—and skip the market definition and
market power analysis.208 But many (perhaps most) Rule of Reason
analyses fall short of “full-blown” status; they are some form of “quick
look” located on the spectrum of analytic intensity between the Rule’s
extreme poles. Here, the requisite empirical showing from a plaintiff is
uncertain and inconsistent.
On the one hand, there is ample support in Supreme Court
jurisprudence that the plaintiff need not show empirical evidence of
harm at all; theoretical harm can suffice. The leading case here is
Engineers, which held that the price-bidding ban was sufficiently
obvious in its anticompetitive effect to make further empirical proof of
harm unnecessary.209 Likewise, the competitive harm condemned in
NCAA was not exactly empirical in nature; the Court did not define a
market, nor did it require rigorous econometric evidence of the
restriction’s effect.210 Taken together, these cases could be understood
to mean that empirical proof—through market power or actual effects—
is (at least sometimes) unnecessary in many Rule of Reason cases. Some
lower courts have applied this logic and condemned restraints under

206. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Comment, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving
Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 526 (2000) (describing full-blown rule of reason analysis as
“requiring empirical proof of anticompetitive effect or economic proof of market power”).
207. Gavil, supra note 172, at 755 (“[T]he market power of a combination may be so obvious
that no elaborate evaluation is needed and rule of reason analysis may therefore be ‘truncated.’ ”
(quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 16–17, NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271))).
208. Actual higher prices or restricted output is seen as evidence, a fortiori, of market power,
which is defined as the ability to raise price or reduce output anticompetitively, thus a separate
showing of market power is unnecessary. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38 (1984) (citing
Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
209. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“[N]o elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.”).
210. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100.
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the Rule of Reason without rigorous market definitions or econometric
analyses of effects on price or output.211
On the other hand, the Court’s opinions in California Dental and
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD)212 cast significant doubt on
that conclusion. In IFD, the Court condemned a rule, passed and
enforced by a federation of dentists that made up about 85% of the
state’s practicing dentists,213 that prohibited dentists from sharing xrays with insurance companies.214 The Court emphasized the fact that
the plaintiffs were able to show that the insurers were “actually unable
to obtain compliance with their requests for submission of x rays,”
which the court characterized as “actual detrimental effects”
evidence.215 This case standing alone does not mean that a plaintiff
must show “actual effects” evidence to succeed under the Rule of
Reason; rather, the opinion could mean that such evidence is
sufficient—but not always necessary—to carry a plaintiff’s burden.
But the Court’s subsequent holding in California Dental placed
that interpretation on shaky ground. There, although the Court
acknowledged that a “theoretical basis for anticompetitive effects” can
suffice, its holding—that the theoretical anticompetitive effects of an
advertising ban were insufficient to shift the burden to the defendant—
seemed to say the opposite.216 Indeed, some lower courts have
interpreted California Dental and IFD as requiring “actual evidence” to
shift the plaintiff’s burden.217 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the
California Dental case on remand is an extreme example: there the

211. See, e.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362–68 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that the “net anticompetitive effects of [defendants’] practices were obvious” without
empirical proof); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (condemning the NCAA’s
restrictions on assistant basketball coaches’ salaries without defining a market or determining
through empirical means that salaries would be higher absent the restrictions).
212. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465–66 (1986).
213. Id. at 449.
214. The insurance companies had demanded the x-rays as a way to contain costs. Id. at 449–
50.
215. Id. at 460 (quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 429).
216. See Gavil, supra note 172, at 757–59 (“[S]ome of the language used by the Supreme Court
in California Dental appeared to limit [quick look Rule of Reason] to cases involving evidence of
actual anticompetitive effects.”).
217. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc. 651 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting that although “it is true that the arrangement provides a cushion that may arguably affect
incentives to compete, that alone, absent evidence of actual anticompetitive impact on pricing, is
not sufficient” to resolve the issue on a “quick look” basis); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour
Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 832 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “[b]ecause ‘the contours of the market’ here are
not ‘sufficiently well-known,’ ” quick look was an inappropriate mode of analysis) (quoting
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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court rejected even empirical evidence from the FTC about the effect of
advertising bans because the studies examined a different industry.218
The ambiguity in the case law about how much “actual evidence”
(of competitive effects or of market power) is required to qualify for
quick look review or satisfy the quick look standard allows lower courts
significant leeway in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. High burdens on the
plaintiff to show market power219 and other demands of empirical
evidence are useful if courts wish to avoid the appearance of
incommensurate balancing, but they distort § 1 litigation by holding
plaintiffs to a burden of “actual evidence” while allowing defendants to
prevail with only theoretical benefits to competition or welfare.220
IV. TOWARDS A COMMENSURABILITY DEBATE:
WHAT’S MISSING FROM ANTITRUST THEORY AND
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The commensurability myth means that judges do not engage
explicitly with the value judgments inherent in most Rule of Reason
cases. But what are those value judgments, and what would exposing
the incommensurability of competitive values mean for antitrust theory
and institutional design?
Section A of this part identifies two debates that are largely
missing from substantive antitrust law and argues that confronting
them would improve antitrust decisionmaking. First, the
commensurability myth has allowed courts and scholars to avoid
decisions about when qualitative aspects of consumer welfare—such as
product quality, innovation, and variety—should outweigh more
quantifiable effects like price and quantity. Second, the myth has
allowed courts to avoid developing a framework for when competitors
may suppress rivalry for the sake of a more functional market. A more
robust theory of industry self-regulation will add much-needed
rationality and transparency to antitrust law.

218. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring “some . . .
relevant data from the precise market at issue in the litigation”). For a critique of this holding, see
Thomas L. Greaney, A Perfect Storm On the Sea of Doubt: Physicians, Professionalism and
Antitrust, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 481, 494 (2002) (describing the Ninth Circuit as
“unjustifiably wary of drawing inferences from those studies as to the likely effects of advertising
restraints by dentists”).
219. See Bhan v. NME Hosps. Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff failed
to make required showing); see also Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12–CV–0029–D, 2012 WL
2358082 at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (dismissing a § 1 claim for failure to empirically define
a market).
220. See, e.g., Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 949, 956.
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Section B discusses the institutional design implications of
confronting the commensurability myth. I first explore the possibility
that commensurability problems point towards more administrative
and less judicial decisionmaking in antitrust, observing that expert
agencies may have an advantage in tackling the quantification
problems that give rise to incommensurability. I then address the
possibility that because antitrust often involves choosing between
competing values, the legislature should take on a larger role in
regulating competition. Finally, I explore the arguments for leaving at
least some antitrust decisionmaking to the courts. I conclude by
suggesting that commensurability problems point towards a blend of
decisionmaking across the branches, but that the current balance is too
focused on courts.
A. Incommensurability in Antitrust: Hidden Debates
In §1 law and policy, debates about how to address the
incommensurability problem are mostly hidden and implicit, resulting
in unsatisfactory judicial decisionmaking about what competitive
values should be prioritized. Two specific examples are discussed here.
Without providing answers to these debates, this subsection frames
these essential questions and illustrates the need for their further
development.
1. When and How to Trade Off Qualitative Effects for Quantitative?
Although consumers benefit both from quantitative measures of
welfare—such as quantity and price—and from qualitative measures—
such as product quality, innovation, and variety—antitrust often
emphasizes the quantitative over the qualitative. For example, the
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued
jointly by the FTC and the DOJ, put price effects first and allow
efficiency arguments (that might go to such qualitative benefits as
“improved quality, enhanced service, or new products”) only after they
pass a very high bar of proof.221A comprehensive study of health

221. FED. TRADE COMM’N & THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 24 (April 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-amongcompetitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ADP-J33L] [hereinafter “COLLABORATIONS
GUIDELINES”] (noting that because “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify,” they must
be verified and may not be “vague or speculative”).
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industry antitrust cases revealed “a lack of attention to quality data,”222
and found that when courts did engage with quality arguments, they
did so “at an abstract rather than a specific level.”223Arguments about
innovation often seem similarly disfavored, perhaps because courts
perceive patent and copyright law as better suited to balancing
innovation concerns. This antitrust-IP dichotomy has led many courts
to avoid crediting arguments about innovation as procompetitive.224
But antitrust’s disfavor of qualitative welfare arguments is far
from complete. The Supreme Court’s opinion in California Dental may
be the most prominent example of a successful qualitative welfare
argument.225 By accepting the dentists’ claim that advertising
restrictions would improve the quality of dental care, the Court
essentially elevated quality over price concerns.226 The Ninth Circuit’s
opinion on remand made this judgment even starker when it held that
empirical evidence about price effects (by analogy to a similar industry)
offered by the FTC was trumped by theoretical quality arguments made
by the dentists.227 Variety and choice, as qualitative benefits to
consumers, are likewise persuasive to antitrust courts,228 and
occasionally even arguments about innovation carry the day in §1
cases.229
222. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 615–16 (2002).
223. Id. at 621.
224. Id. at 628 (observing that the tradeoffs between “competition” and “innovation” appear to
be resolved by defining the domain of antitrust law to exclude disputes classified as patent or
regulatory); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy For Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 637, 651 (2011) (noting that “[a]ntitrust courts defer to patent law within the scope of the
patent right, largely contenting themselves with policing the edges to make sure that parties do
not expand the right beyond its scope” and concluding that “patent law, not antitrust law,
determines how innovation will be protected”). Similarly, the Court’s recent holding in Actavis
could be read as a rejection of the idea that antitrust can vindicate consumer welfare in the form
of possible future innovation. See Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl
Shapiro, Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 19–20 (“[T]his sort of argument was part
of the fundamental approach of the dissent, which favored an exception to antitrust law premised
on the presence of a patent to encourage innovation.”).
225. See infra Section II.B.3.a.
226. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999).
227. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 957 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the FTC’s empirical
evidence suggesting that comparable restrictions on legal advertising contributed to increased
price of legal services in favor of the dentists’ argument that the advertising restrictions are
theoretically procompetitive).
228. Hammer and Sage attribute this to the fact that “[c]hoice is a consideration that is easy
for economists and antitrust lawyers to understand.” Hammer & Sage, supra note 222, at 623.
229. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(suggesting that when patented innovation arises in a market with a variety of competing
products, it may encourage “innovation, industry and competition” as opposed to giving rise to any
antitrust concerns).
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Scholars and courts should be more explicit about when and how
to trade off these different dimensions of consumer welfare. One salient
difference between these sources of consumer welfare is their relative
measurability: the welfare effects of price and quantity, although not
easily ascertained in every case, are more quantifiable than those
associated with innovation, variety, and product quality. But according
empirical quantitative arguments and theoretical qualitative
arguments equal weight may make it too easy for the side raising
qualitative arguments to make its case. This asymmetry may justify a
heavier burden of proof on qualitative arguments; this is arguably the
approach of agencies, as epitomized by the Collaborations Guidelines.230
But where that threshold of proof should lie is not at all obvious, and
deserves more scholarly and judicial attention. Too heavy of a burden
would make qualitative arguments too often unsuccessful precisely
because parties will usually lack hard empirical proof of quality
improvements or increased innovation.
Another consideration in trading off dimensions of consumer
welfare is the problem of subjectivity. Some sources of consumer
welfare, such as low prices and increased innovation, can be reasonably
assumed to benefit all consumers; others, such as quality
improvements, will benefit only some consumers. For someone who is
disinclined to allow restrictions that benefit some consumers at the
expense of others,231 this asymmetry may be another reason for favoring
price effects over claimed quality benefits. But others may believe that
whatever is better for consumers as a whole should be allowed by the
antitrust laws, having no quarrel with an asymmetry of benefits as long
as some consumers receive an aggregate benefit greater than the
aggregate cost to the rest.232

230. See COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 221, at 24 (explaining that efficiencies,
which could theoretically take many qualitative forms, must be quantifiable and verifiable to be
“cognizable” in defending a restraint).
231. Someone subscribing to this view could describe himself as favoring Pareto optimal
antitrust policy. Economist Vilfredo Pareto defined a transaction as efficient if it made at least one
actor better off without making any actor worse off. Pareto efficiency is often associated with the
consumer welfare standard, since it would bless a restriction benefitting producers only if it did
not also harm consumers. See B. Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008),
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000024&edition=current&q=pareto
%20efficiency&topicid=&result_number=1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/N26HWN9L].
232. Someone subscribing to this point of view could describe himself as believing in a KaldorHicks efficient antitrust policy. Economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks defined a transaction
as efficient if it increased total welfare. Some transactions, such as a restriction that harms
consumers but benefits producers by a greater degree, satisfy Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but not
Pareto. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV.
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Others may want to dodge this question altogether by asking, in
the case of quality claims, whether the product faces competition from
another set of products technically outside of the market defined in the
case. Where that is true, one may be less worried about the subjectivity
problem in the first place. An example may be the NCAA cases where,
although courts typically define the market as college sports,233 the fact
that consumers may choose professional sports instead makes
qualitative arguments about the “character” of intercollegiate sports
especially convincing.234
Striking the right balance between qualitative and quantitative
measures of consumer welfare may depend on the industry. For
example, where the costs of inferior quality are especially high, such as
in the healthcare industry, some may argue that quality claims should
receive an especially warm welcome from antitrust courts. And some
may argue for similar deference to qualitative arguments in industries
ripe for market failures that lead to less-than-optimal quality,
innovation, or choice. Others may take the opposite perspective, and
point out that industries where low-quality products are dangerous and
that are ripe for market failures—such as professional services like
healthcare—tend to be regulated by other sources of law. In industries
where occupational licensing and quality oversight have addressed
qualitative measures of consumer welfare, some may take a skeptical
view of antitrust defenses identifying non-price benefits.
Finally, antitrust should confront the innovation problem headon, rather than vacillate between deference to intellectual property law
and naïve assertion that competition, as vindicated by antitrust law,
solves all innovation problems.235 Here the scholarship has surpassed
the doctrine; courts should directly engage with arguments made by
scholars like Mark Lemley about the appropriate balance between
antitrust law and intellectual property rights.236 Again, this balance

1539, 1569 (1989). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is therefore associated with the “total welfare” antitrust
standard. See also Craswell, supra note 15, at 1450–56 (discussing the Kaldor-Hicks solution to
the problem of incommensurability between individuals, and noting its shortcomings).
233. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 (1984).
234. Indeed, the NCAA has successfully raised this “character” argument several times. See
id. at 101–02; Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
235. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
406 (2004) (arguing that competition promotes the “risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth”); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del.
2006) (noting that innovation, including patented technology, inherently inflicts harm on
competitors, but antitrust laws should not intervene so long as it remains “a matter of consumer
choice”).
236. Lemley, supra note 224, at 648.
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may be industry specific, since different industries require different
competitive incentives to optimize innovation.237
Setting these thresholds and determining the optimal balance
between qualitative and quantitative arguments about consumer
welfare will require judgment, not science, and will benefit from an
open debate. That is not to say that all courts and commentators are
ignoring these issues; they underlie many current antitrust disputes,
but they do so in a way that is latent and therefore less transparent.
The paradigm of “net” competitive effects has made overt discussion of
these issues rare.
2. When Does a Market Failure Justify Restraints
Suppressing Rivalry?
The reorientation of antitrust around an economic standard
changed the way courts saw restraints on rivalry, departing from the
previous doctrine that was inhospitable to arguments that market
failures could make uncoordinated competition inefficient.238 But
current doctrine lacks a coherent theory about when a market failure
justifies suppressing rivalry and which restraints pass muster under
the Rule of Reason. Development of such a theory has been hindered by
commensurability rhetoric that instructs courts to maximize
competition, without defining that term. A lively debate about when one
kind of competition (coordinated, but functional competition) is better
than another kind (atomistic, rivalrous competition) would help carve
out a space for industry self-regulation without ceding all control over
competition to those who have the most to gain by self-dealing.
A fundamental step in setting the terms of this debate is to
define “competition.” At times, courts use it to mean “rivalry,” such as
when the Court censured the engineers for their argument that
competition (rivalry) was against the public interest.239 At other times,
courts use the term to refer to a well-functioning market, as in
California Dental when the Court championed the procompetitive
potential of the dentists’ restraints on advertising.240 Yet another
possible definition of “competition” would refer to the presence of
conditions that economists associate with perfect competition, such as
numerous buyers and sellers, good information, and internalized costs

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
See generally Meese, supra note 96, 1775–1808.
Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978).
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).
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and benefits.241 This meaning is perhaps what the Court had in mind in
Chicago Board of Trade when it applauded the restriction’s tendency to
thicken the market with more sellers and buyers, and cited that fact as
suggesting that the restriction “merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition.”242 Ultimately, the debate about the meaning of
“competition” will likely reveal that all three of these definitions are
relevant and important, and that the Rule of Reason requires balancing
them, but the first step is to be clear that they represent distinct facets
of “competition.”
Armed with a better sense of the meaning(s) of competition,
antitrust courts and commentators should then develop a theory about
what circumstances justify private restrictions on rivalry. At least one
scholar believes that the Sherman Act forbids private regulation of
competition altogether,243 and although his opinion seems likely to be
in the minority,244 it is striking how little debate there is about this idea.
More robust is the debate about whether market failures justify
competitive restraints and, if so, which kinds are particularly
appropriate for redress through private contracts in restraint of trade.
Professor Alan Meese has several interesting pieces on these questions,
ultimately suggesting that restraints addressing market failures from
“a poor assignment of property rights” resulting in a “misalignment of
incentives” should be seen as procompetitive.245 In contrast, he argues,
restrictions designed to address failures caused by “high information
costs and consumers’ inability to perceive their own interests” should
be suspect under § 1.246 Other scholars have taken up the relationship
between market failure and § 1 liability, but their work proposes very
controversial changes to existing law247 or focuses only on market
241. See Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill, Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and
Antitrust Decisionmaking, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 583, 587 (1984) (describing the conditions associated
with perfectly competitive markets).
242. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
243. See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 69 (arguing that antitrust is “[n]ot merely a rule of
economic regulation, [but] a rule against private regulation”).
244. Daniel A. Crane, “The Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” Really?, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL.
17, 19 (2013) (finding it “difficult to credit the paper's theory that the property/regulatory
distinction supplies a general, positive theory of U.S. antitrust doctrine”).
245. Meese, supra note 96, at 1807; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of
Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 168–70 (2003).
246. Meese, supra note 96, at 1807. Yet another approach is suggested by Engineers: market
failures already addressed by government regulation (such as professional licensing or building
codes) should not be used to justify restraints on rivalry.
247. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 54, at 1021 (arguing that antitrust law should “recognize an
efficiencies defense that would allow limited-term collaborative action to correct market failure,
subject to ex ante scrutiny and ex post audit”); Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition:
Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH.
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failures in a particular industry.248 In any case, none of this scholarship
has induced courts to enter the fray, and the judiciary is an important
voice in this debate.
Another important debate missing from the free-or-functional
market controversy is the extent to which the process behind the
restraint’s creation and enforcement should matter for antitrust
liability. The process behind a restraint’s enforcement proved
dispositive in the Supreme Court’s 1963 opinion in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange,249 but the Court has not addressed the question since.
Perhaps Silver is right that the anticompetitive nature of a restraint on
rivalry is intimately related to the process of its creation and
enforcement, and that the possibility of meaningful dissent from a
restraint’s victims makes all the difference.250 But it could also be
argued that the process of private restraint creation is too opaque and
unaccountable to ever serve as a factor in liability. These questions
deserve more scholarly and judicial attention.251
Calibrating the tradeoff between rivalry and self-regulation will
also require drawing limits on how far self-regulators can go in
suppressing rivalry. Section 1 case law illustrates that a relatively
minor market failure cannot justify permanent destruction of all
rivalry, but the cases are not clear on where the line lies between
permissible self-regulation and unreasonable restraint of trade. Some
scholars have suggested that courts should emphasize the duration of
restrictions, with temporary restrictions receiving more leeway under §
1.252 Many scholars and judicial opinions hold that restrictions on one
dimension of competition that leave free competition along other
important dimensions are better than ones that foreclose all forms of

L. REV. 849, 851 (2000) (“[A]ntitrust law should recognize a defense for private acts that restrain
‘competition’ under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare.”); Christopher R.
Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal PriceFixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 291 (1993) (arguing for a pure “efficiency” standard even for pricefixing).
248. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust
Healthcare Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (1989) (approaching the topic of market
failures with a focus on the health care industry).
249. 373 U.S. 341, 356–67 (1963).
250. Cf. id. at 361–67 (holding that a self-regulatory body’s failure to hold a hearing before
terminating a member’s privileges violated the Sherman Act).
251. At least one lower court has arguably addressed this issue; the membership of the alleged
cartel in Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1987), which could be seen as
a feature of its decision-making process, proved important to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in that
case.
252. Brodley, supra note 54, at 1042.
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rivalry.253 But again, there is insufficient debate about how long is too
long, or how to trade off different kinds of rivalry.
B. Incommensurability and Institutional Design
Fully recognizing the commensurability problem in antitrust
suggests that the current allocation of decisionmaking—which relies
heavily on courts—is not optimal. I do not set out in this section to make
a precise recommendation of how power would optimally be allocated;
rather, I intend to outline the terms of the institutional design debate
that—largely because of the commensurability myth—has so far
remained underdeveloped, and to suggest ways in which the
commensurability problem should influence this debate.
1. The Case for Agency Decisionmaking:
Expertise and Cost-Benefit Analysis
As I have argued in previous work, the current dominance of
judicial decisionmaking in antitrust law and policy is inefficient,254 and
the commensurability problem may be another reason to be critical of
courts as antitrust regulators. In these articles I argue that courts,
lacking access to high-level expertise and the power to study economic
phenomena in a systematic way, are ill-equipped to serve as the
primary rule makers in an area of law now dominated by questions of
economic science. Agencies on the other hand, especially the Federal
Trade Commission, do have such expertise and ability to generate and
analyze econometric data.255 And because agency regulation often
involves making widely applicable rules, rather than individual
holdings with potentially narrow application, the FTC could more
efficiently and comprehensively provide guidance to firms who wish to
avoid antitrust liability.

253. The Supreme Court’s vertical restraint jurisprudence provides some good examples. See,
e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007) (finding that
restrictions which foreclose one dimension of competition, such as intrabrand, yet promote another
dimension, like interbrand, should be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se
approach); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (same, as applied to vertical maximum
price fixing); Cont’l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (same, as applied to
vertical territorial restraints).
254. Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2011) [hereinafter Haw, Amicus Briefs]; Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits
for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, 55 B. C. L. REV. 331 (2014) [hereinafter
Haw, Delay].
255. Haw, Amicus Briefs, supra note 254, at 1262–63.
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For the same reasons, using an agency like the FTC for antitrust
law making and adjudication may have significant advantages over
courts when it comes to addressing the commensurability problem. To
a large extent, the problem is one of quantification; as discussed in Part
II.A.1, incommensurability in antitrust cases often arises from lack of
data about how consumers behave when offered better quality products
or more variety. In contrast to a court, an agency like the FTC has the
ability to gather, or even require disclosure of, data from various
industries.256 And when clear data about consumer preferences is
unavailable, an agency like the FTC can use its staff of economists to
develop ingenious ways—such as by analogy to other industries—of
making quantitative estimates of qualitative consumer benefits.
The fact that the incommensurability problem derives in large
part from quantification problems, and the fact that some of these
problems may be overcome by econometric analysis, suggests yet
another reason why increased agency decisionmaking may be optimal
for antitrust. Cost-benefit analysis, a frequently-used technique in
agency rulemaking, may deliver significant payoffs for antitrust law.
Although it is not unusual to casually refer to Rule of Reason analysis
as being analogous to cost-benefit analysis,257 there seems to be little
appetite for applying to antitrust the kind of empirically rigorous CBA
required for many agency rules and regulations. As a practical matter,
this lack of interest in CBA makes sense; the Sherman Act does not call
for it, and agencies like the FTC almost never engage in rulemaking
that might trigger the need for CBA. But as a matter of theory, it is far
from clear that CBA would be an inappropriate method for trading off
the otherwise incommensurate values in competition regulation.
I am not prepared to argue here the full-throated case for CBA
in antitrust, but I believe the commensurability myth has suppressed
important debates about its merits in the antitrust context. CBA is
perhaps most appropriate when the costs and benefits of regulation are
relatively quantifiable, and when some consensus exists on the social
values sought by regulation, as is perhaps true in antitrust.258
Although, as I explore in Part II, not all costs and benefits of a given

256. Id. at 1259.
257. See, e.g., Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its “Rule of Reason”:
The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REV.
129, 157–58 (1989) (“The GTE Sylvania approach suffers from the fundamental flaw inherent in
all cost-benefit analysis . . . .”).
258. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2008)
(arguing that three conditions make antitrust ideal for a technocratic shift: “consensus on ends,
resolution of foundational ideological questions, and the absence of explicit distributive
considerations in most antitrust adjudication”).

2016]

THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH

65

regulation are perfectly quantifiable, they are probably no harder to
quantify than in other areas of regulation where CBA is the norm, such
as in environmental and workplace law. And although the social values
vindicated by antitrust are somewhat varied, giving rise to questions
such as whether any weight should be given to future benefits from
innovation, or whether it is acceptable to benefit one kind of consumer
at the expense of another, those values—economic efficiency,
competition, and consumer welfare—occupy a relatively narrow
bandwidth when compared to other areas where CBA is used
extensively. More needs to be said about whether CBA offers a fruitful
way to address the commensurability problem in antitrust, as it has in
other areas of law.
2. The Case for Legislative Guidance:
Balancing Competing Social Values
The tradeoffs required by antitrust regulation may be more
circumscribed than in many areas of law, but because the quantification
problem is only partly to blame for antitrust’s incommensurability, and
because the quantitative problem cannot always be satisfactorily
solved, antitrust law will likely always require important compromises
between competing values. The indeterminacy of economics on
questions from how to measure quality to how to trade off interpersonal
welfare259 is perhaps illustrated by the divergence between American
antitrust and EU competition law. Both regimes prize economic
efficiency and consumer welfare, both use the expertise of economists,
and yet they often diverge in rule and rule application.260 This
divergence suggests that value judgments—tasks typically associated
with legislative decisionmaking261—are required to regulate
competition.
When Justice Scalia said that choosing between state and
national interests in Dormant Commerce Clause cases was less like
balancing and “more like judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy,” his solution was “to leave [the]

259. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448–50 (explaining that welfare economics “does not
pretend to offer any theory of how to justify decisions that would affect more than one individual,
if some individuals would gain while others lose”); Hammer & Sage, supra note 222, at 612
(“[E]conomists scrupulously abstain from opining whether higher quality at a higher price is better
or worse than lower quality at a lower price.”).
260. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104
NW. U. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2010).
261. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 20, at 839 (arguing that “[t]he choice of ultimate values,
however, is usually regarded as a function of the legislature”).
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essentially legislative judgments to the Congress.”262 Although he did
not explain why he considered the decision “legislative” or why it was
best reserved to the Congress, his reasoning is easily supplied. When
regulation requires different social values to be traded off, the most
appropriate decisionmaker is the one most democratically accountable.
In theory, the different social values at stake will be represented in an
elected body of government, lending democratic legitimacy to whatever
compromise follows.
Because at least some of the commensurability problem is
unavoidable—especially the problem of choosing between different
consumer groups—legislative decisionmaking may be the most
legitimate means of making some antitrust rules. Antitrust does not
implicate the same diversity of interests present in other areas of
regulation, nor even the diversity of interests that it once vindicated, as
when antitrust was seen as a tool to protect small businesses or
encourage the decentralization of the economy and political power.263
But the commensurability problem does present choices among
competing interests that would suggest that at least some antitrust
decisionmaking qualifies under Justice Scalia’s paradigm as
“legislative.”
The trouble with making the argument that more antitrust law
should be done legislatively is that the Congress already has broad
powers to regulate competition that it has chosen not to use. The
Sherman Act was of course an act of legislation, but its text was so broad
as to leave wide discretion to courts and agencies in its
implementation.264 And there has been relatively little legislative
activity in antitrust since. This inactivity would suggest that there are
significant barriers to creating antitrust legislation.
One such barrier could be simple legislative inertia; antitrust
has ceased to be the hot button political issue it once was, and so has
been placed on the legislative back burner. In a world where passing
even highly salient legislation is nearly impossible, back-burner status
means almost total paralysis. Another reason why Congress may have
preferred to leave antitrust law making to courts is that the world of
antitrust is dynamic—both economic science and the structure and

262. Bendix Autolight Corp. v. Midwestco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988).
263. See Crane, supra note 258, at 1211–12 (2008) (describing the prior views on the goals of
the Sherman Act and the modern consensus on economic welfare).
264. In the words of William Howard Taft, the Sherman Act was written “with the intention
that they should be interpreted in the light of common law, just as it has been frequently decided
that the terms used in our federal Constitution are to be so construed.” WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT,
THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1914).
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practices of industry change rapidly.265 In an environment of moving
targets, the common law, with its ability to evolve, may be a more
efficient way to regulate than by static statutory language.266 Whatever
its cause, the reality of legislative inactivity must be considered before
offering Congressional involvement as a cure-all for the
commensurability problem in antitrust.
3. The Case for Courts: Judgment, Not Calculation
Having made the case for some increased involvement by expert
agencies and for more legislative activity, while acknowledging that
expecting too much of Congress is unrealistic, I turn to the role of courts
in addressing the commensurability problem in antitrust law. Despite
the common conception that courts are ill-suited to make law, and the
perhaps less common conception that they do not make law, courts do
have some advantages over legislative branches in regulating activity.
Even given the commensurability problems that courts confront, it is
worth exploring whether the judiciary’s advantages over Congress
justify leaving it some norm-creation role. Further, although there are
good arguments for an increased role for agencies in antitrust
adjudication and rulemaking, the commensurability problem militates
against a total technocratic shift for antitrust.
When it comes to creating rules about how to trade off
incommensurate competitive values, Congress may have the advantage
of democratic legitimacy, but it also has the disadvantage of exercising
only discretionary power. This discretion leads to the back-burner and
inertia problems discussed above, while courts must, by virtue of
deciding individual disputes, create antitrust law at a relatively steady
pace.267 Similarly, because courts are asked to respond to evolving
commercial practices and to apply the best economic science available
in the moment, they are arguably more able to respond to social and
scientific change relevant to regulation. To the extent the
commensurability problem changes shape over time—and there is
reason to believe that it does—courts may be better positioned to make

265. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the ‘Common Law’
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982).
266. See Haw, Delay, supra note 254, at 347 (noting that the Court and proponents of the
Sherman Act as a common law statute argue that “only common law rulemaking can respond to
the diverse business practices that arise over time in response to changes in the economy and
innovation in product development and distribution”).
267. Note that this is not true for the Supreme Court, which, like Congress, has discretion over
its exercise of rule-making power. Id. at 248–49.
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the kinds of rules and compromises called for by incommensurability in
antitrust.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s claim that all value-laden choices should
be made by a legislature and not the judiciary seems exaggerated.268
Inherent in the very idea of judging is the notion of judgment; courts
are frequently delegated regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must
choose between valid and important social values. Judges may be more
insulated from and unresponsive to public opinion than the
legislature,269 but courts are often asked, especially in the constitutional
arena, to make tough calls between competing values. Their insulation
from public opinion could actually be a comparative advantage, one that
gives the judiciary “the [fundamental] freedom and responsibility to
decide [cases] on broad social considerations.”270
As I have argued elsewhere, more antitrust authority should be
delegated to agencies, and the commensurability problem mostly
underscores this point. But because some incommensurability is
inherent—that is, it is not just a problem of quantification—the
technocratic nature of antitrust should not be exaggerated. A total shift
of adjudicative and rule-making power to agencies may be a bridge too
far when antitrust is an exercise in judgment, not just calculation. The
reality of antitrust regulation is that it is—and must be—a
collaboration between those trained in the scientific practice of
measuring harms and benefits of a competitive practice and those
qualified to apply value judgments in the close calls.271

268. Professor Bork made a similar claim, in the antitrust context:
[A]n expansion of output through increased efficiency . . . might impose other welfare
losses on society. [This is] a problem whose solution lies with the legislature rather than
the judiciary. . . . A trade-off in values is required, and that is properly done by the
legislature and reflected in specialized legislation. It cannot properly form the stuff of
antitrust litigation.
BORK, supra note 13, at 114–15.
269. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 141–42 (1994).
270. Id. at 150. In addition, the judicial tradition of writing opinions—especially if the
incommensurability problem is recognized and incorporated explicitly into antitrust cases—will
help make for better and more transparent antitrust law than could be performed by technocrats
alone. Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, The Science Obsession and Judicial Review
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011) (describing judicial review as
serving the function of demystifying the science on which agencies rely and explaining the
scientific bases of agency decisions to the general public).
271. That collaboration could be made more fertile by teaching judges some quantitative skills
necessary to understand the tradeoffs they are asked to make. See Haw, Delay, supra note 254, at
349–50.
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CONCLUSION
Antitrust’s focus on economic and competitive effects has
probably made the law more rational, predictable, and efficient, but it
has not made it free from value judgments. Although antitrust courts
routinely describe their task in § 1 cases as measuring the “net
competitive effect” of a restraint on trade, competitive effects argued on
either side are typically different in kind, and so cannot be reduced to a
“net” effect. Pro- and anticompetitive effects of agreements among
competitors, as they are presented to courts, are usually
incommensurate and balancing them under the Rule of Reason requires
value judgments that often economic science cannot supply.
The commensurability myth, here illustrated by Rule of Reason
cases, pervades all areas of antitrust law where courts must trade off
pro- and anticompetitive effects. The myth has led courts to undertake
numerous avoidance moves in § 1 litigation that make antitrust less
predictable and less fair. It has prevented important academic and
judicial debates from reaching maturity: more should be said and
written about how to trade off the qualitative dimensions of consumer
welfare for quantitative ones, and about when market failures justify a
departure from rivalrous competition. And more needs to be said about
how the commensurability problem should influence the institutional
design of antitrust law and enforcement. This Article, by identifying the
myth and some of its consequences, takes the first step in developing a
healthy discourse about what kinds of competition are most important.
It is time to let go of the view that antitrust is exceptional. Despite our
modern economic-driven conception of it, antitrust law is not just a
maximization problem, but also an exercise in judgment.

